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The academic literature has extensively confirmed that firms 
and their supply chains (SCs) are vulnerable to a wide range of 
risks (Zsidisin, 2003). From a single firm perspective, the risk 
management discipline has evolved from a traditional, defensive 
approach focused on the prevention of and protection against 
adverse financial and operational consequences (Gaudenzi and 
Borghesi, 2006) to the more proactive enterprise risk 
management (ERM) approach (Gatzert and Martin, 2015) and 
the wider concept of resilience in SC networks (Christopher, 
2016; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). 
An emerging risk for firms and SCs is cyber risk, whose 
occurrence has dramatically increased over the last years, 
jumping from fourth to second place in the most-reported types 
of economic crime in 2016 (PWC Global Economic Crime 
Survey of 2016). 
The digitalization and extensive use of information technology 
(IT) represents a fertile field for both malevolent actors and 
unintentional cyber-related mistakes that lead to business 
disruption and damages to tangible and intangible corporate 
assets, such as financial and reputational drawbacks (Amin, 
2017; Martin et al., 2017; Martin and Murphy, 2017; Eling and 
Schnell, 2016; Romanosky, 2016). 
The IT literature has shown great interest in cyber risk, mainly 
identifying technical solutions to face these emerging risks. 
Nonetheless, cyber risks require a major integration between 
technical solutions and strategic management. Recently, the risk 
management domain and the SC literature have provided studies 
about how an effective cyber risk management process should 
be planned to improve firmal resilience and prevent financial 
drawbacks. 
The risk management process consists of two main phases: (i) 
the risk assessment, comprising the risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation and (ii) the risk treatment (ISO 
31000, 2009). 
The risk assessment process is a set of systematic activities that 
provide rigorous identification, measurement, quantification and 
evaluation for each risk (Haimes, 2015; Zsidisin et al., 2004; 
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Zsidisin et al., 2000). Risk treatment, on the other hand, is the 
process of taking a specific course of action to reduce the 
probability and impact of risks and to transfer the financial 
consequences of negative events to third parties (Pritchard, 
2014; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). 
In such a context, a thorough cyber risk assessment should 
consider the inherent characteristics of cyber risks so that firms 
are sure to allocate specific investments accordingly (PWC, 
2014). 
In particular, two major characteristics of cyber risk have been 
ascertained in the literature: (i) the probability of occurrence and 
(ii) its different sources (Eling and Schnell, 2016; Biener et al., 
2015; Refsdal et al., 2015). 
With respect to the probability of occurrence, cyber risks may 
be distinguished between ‘black swans’, or incidents that occur 
as a complete surprise (Ab Rahman et al., 2016; Refsdal et al., 
2015; Higgins, 2014; Coburn et al., 2013) and ‘grey swans’, 
which are incidents that could be anticipated (Ab Rahman et al., 
2016; Refsdal et al., 2015; Coburn et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, both management practitioners and academicians 
have tried to categorise the different types of cyber risk (Table 
1).  
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(https://www.privacyrights.org) provides a fairly 
comprehensive database in which data breaches since 2005 are 
categorised across two dimensions: the level of intentionality 
characterising the cyber issue and whether cyber risks may stem 
from inside or outside the company. 
The management literature has confirmed this categorization. In 
particular, a cyber risk may be caused accidentally by actors 
within the firm (Furnell et al., 2017; Eling and Schnell, 2016; 
Hall, 2016; Sen and Borle, 2015; Pearson et al., 2014; Strand, 
2014; Jaeger, 2013) or deliberately by internal or external actors 
to damage companies (Kude et al., 2017; Eling and Schnell, 
2016; Manworren et al., 2016; Refsdal et al., 2015; Sen and 








Despite advances in categorizing these vulnerabilities, cyber 
risk assessment still appears to be challenging. In fact, the 
current guidelines for defining likelihood, a key point in the risk 
assessment phase, may be of little help in identifying and 
predicting black swans, but may be well suited to cope with so-
called ‘grey swans’ (Refsdal et al., 2015). 
In this phase, studies stress the relevance of involving experts in 
the field, as their experience may help in assessing present and 
future cyber-related threats (Amin, 2017; Caldwell 2017; Biener 
et al., 2015). 
With respect to risk treatment, particularly risk treatment 
solutions, the literature highlights that a sustainable cyber 
insurance market is still in its infancy, and there is a need to 
improve the competitiveness of the cyber insurance market 
(Marotta et al., 2017; Eling and Schnell, 2016; Romanosky, 
2016; Biener et al., 2015; Yang and Lui, 2014). 
Cyber risk transfer has played only a minor role because of a 
lack of data; the dynamicity of cyber risks – namely, the high 
risk of change; and information asymmetry problems (Marotta 
et al., 2017; Eling and Schnell, 2016; Biener et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the literature highlights that market offerings to cover 
malicious cyber risk are more developed than those for non-
Table 1. Categorization of cyber risks 
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malicious events (Franke, 2017). 
The extant cyber insurance literature suggests systematic data 
collection to capture the dynamic changes affecting the cyber 
insurance market and to provide a path for improving insurance 
coverage. Moreover, Woods et al. (2017) stress the relevance of 
the policy maker’s involvement to avoid disparity between 
insurance practices and IT best practices. 
Romanosky (2016) points out that not every data breach is 
dramatic, such as the one Target suffered that exposed the 
personal data of 70 million customers in 2013 (Martyn, 2015). 
A scarce range of cyber insurance policies may consequently be 
due to the generally moderate business costs stemming from the 
occurrence of cyber risk. Eling and Schnell (2016) only partially 
agree with this view, suggesting that while the costs and 
detrimental effects cyber risk causes must be critically 
questioned, the major part of these detrimental effects is indirect 
(e.g. reputation, loss of trust). Moreover, given a globally 
connected economy and society, the potential consequences of 
cyber risks for companies and individuals are considerable, 
leading to enormous accumulations risk insurers should 
consider. 
Yang and Lui (2014) underline how decisions about investing in 
cyber insurance stem from an interdependent process where 
security investments made by one node of the business network 
can affect the security risk of the others. In this context, 
companies’ prevention measures depend on the security policies 
of their partners and customers; they are as exposed as their 
weakest link is (Khan and Estay, 2015). Thus, the presence of 
insurance policies that cover various levels of the business 
network’s nodes may be a positive incentive for security 
adoption (Yang and Lui, 2014). 
In spite of its increasing relevance for firms, cyber risk research 
is still limited. The majority of research can be found in the 
information management and technology domain, with few 
studies in the management and economics literature (Eling and 
Schnell, 2016; Biener et al., 2015). From an SC perspective, 
cyber risks are among the inherent risks of a more volatile 
business environment. For example, 600 million Samsung 
Galaxy phones were recently discovered to have a major 
security flaw originating from one of Samsung’s keyboard 
software suppliers, and the 2013 Target breach stemmed from a 




In this context, Christopher (2016) stresses how studies have 
shifted from a mainly operational approach (Yang et al., 2017; 
McNeil et al., 2015; Stevenson and Hojati, 2007) to a more 
strategic one focused on value creation and delivery 
(Christopher, 2016; Bromiley et al., 2015; Gatzert and Martin, 
2015). This means the literature is abandoning the logistics lens 
when studying SCs and now considers them complex networks 
made up of ‘multiple suppliers and, indeed, suppliers to 
suppliers as well as multiple customers and customers’ 
customers’ (Christopher, 2016, Inp. 3). As these relationships 
are increasingly interdependent, the main goal cannot be cost 
minimisation or service optimisation, but rather implementing 
strategic actions, such as encouraging more collaborative work, 
in order to achieve greater visibility of upstream and 
downstream risk profiles and a shared involvement in managing 
those risks (Christopher, 2016; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 
2009). With particular respect to cyber risks, Khan and Estay 
(2015) highlight that modern SCs are a lucrative and easy target 
for cyber criminals because of the amount of strategic 
information they share. The authors suggest developing superior 
resilience, which refers to the SC’s ability to cope with 
unexpected disturbances, and recognising the paramount 
importance of companies developing cyber-resilience, defining 
it as ‘the capability of a SC to maintain its operational 
performance when faced with cyber-risk’ (p. 7). 
The related literature suggests that, to improve cyber-resilience, 
strategic actions should involve government entities and boost 
business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-government (B2G) 
data sharing (Urciuoli, 2015). In general, SC cyber-resilience 
requires shifting from mere technological solutions to a more 
holistic approach (Boyes, 2015) in which information, visibility 
and transparency are implemented both upstream and 
downstream (Davis, 2015). 
However, Khan and Estay (2015) stress that there is a lack of 
theoretical and empirical research to address cyber risks within 
SCs. 
From a single firm perspective, the management literature 
mainly focuses on the customer-related drawbacks a cyber 
breach causes, drawing from the concepts of data privacy 
management and reputation management (Martin, 2018; Ferrell, 
2017; Kashmiri et al., 2017; Martin and Murphy, 2017; Martin 
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et al., 2017; Manworren et al., 2016). 
Studies ascertain that customers respond negatively to data 
breaches, producing a range of negative emotional and cognitive 
responses against the firm (Martin et al., 2017). What is more, 
the increasing prominence of social media and digital evolution 
represent additional threats to firms, amplifying such negative 
effects on reputation (Gatzert, 2015) and financial performance 
(Martin et al., 2017). 
However, the aforementioned research fails to capture other 
equally relevant effects, such as corporate reputation harm. 
Management studies also highlight that the role of management 
is of paramount importance in training employees (Soomro et 
al., 2016; Strand, 2014), to facilitate the upstream reporting of 
issues and to engage in efficient and clear communication with 
customers (Soomro et al., 2016). Investing in human capital and 
training should lead to greater awareness. In fact, most people 
are trained to keep their firewalls and anti-virus software 
updated (Hall, 2016; Strand, 2014), but data breaches often 
occur due to negligence, ignorance, apathy or resistance (Safa et 
al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of research providing guidance on 
and frameworks about how to boost a cyber security culture that 
renders cyber risk management procedures fully understood and 
accepted (Ferrell, 2017; Manworren et al., 2016). 
As shown above, there have been significant descriptive studies 
documenting data security issues. However, cyber risk actors 
must be further analysed, and the implications for customers, 
employees and critical assets like corporate reputation should be 
addressed (Ferrell, 2017; Martin et al., 2017). 
 
Scope of the research and publications 
 
During the Ph.D. program, a comprehensive analysis of the 
potential effects of cyber threats was conducted within single 
companies and along networks of relationships in a wider SC 
perspective. 
As a consequence, three studies have been developed to 
investigate cyber risk management, adopting two different units 
of analysis: the single firm and the SC. 
The three studies aim at addressing the following research 





- How do managers perceive and define cyber risk? What is the 
difference from IT risk? 
- How does cyber risk represent a threat to the value creation of 
a single company? 
- When and how does cyber risk affect the continuity and 
vulnerability of the SC? 
- When and how does cyber risk affect the reputation of the 
downstream SC? 
 
Gaudenzi, B., & Siciliano, G. (2017). Just do it. Managing IT 
and Cyber Risks to Protect the Value Creation. Journal of 
Promotion Management, 1-14 
 
The paper is published in the Journal of Promotion 
Management, a peer-reviewed publication indexed in Scopus. 
The research was developed in collaboration with Prof. Barbara 
Gaudenzi. 
The focus of the research is two-fold. 
The first aim of this research is to study cyber risk as a business 
disruptor and its differences with respect to IT operational risks. 
In fact, the literature provides scant contributions that define 
cyber risk, which have mainly related to IT risk (Ward, 2012; 
Sheriff et al., 2011; Melville, 2010) and have sometimes used 
cyber risk as its synonym (Schryen, 2013; Smirnov et al., 2013; 
Von Solms and Van Niekerk, 2013; Mithas et al., 2011). 
The second goal of this empirical analysis is to provide in-depth 
insights into how managers plan an efficient and effective risk 
management process. 
Considering the novelty of the investigation and the need to use 
an inductive approach that builds theory from data (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Suddaby, 2006), the study addressed a 
questionnaire to 15 companies, grounding it in the literature. In 
particular, the study is grounded in the dynamic capabilities 
perspective (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Teece, 2007) in order to analyse 
how relational, firmal and technical capabilities should be 
integrated (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007) to better 
manage IT and cyber risks. 
In this perspective, the authors highlight that the (risk) 
perceptions of individual actors in different functions of the firm 
should be well aligned to make good decisions (Ambrosini & 
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Bowlman, 2009; Li & Liu, 2014; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). 
 
This process led to interviews with 15 security/risk managers of 
European firms, whose answers were then analysed through a 
fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Fiss, 2011; 
Ragin and Fiss; 2008; Rihoux, 2006; Ragin and Pennings, 
2005). 
This qualitative methodology has been increasingly used in 
management studies (Kraus et al., 2017) because of its main 
advantage in that it provides configurations of the solutions 
subjects use to reach a specific goal (Tóth et al., 2017; Yu et al., 
2016; Rihoux, 2006). In this case, the implementation of the 
fsQCA methodology was particularly fitting, as it highlighted 
the different cyber risk management solutions managers adopt 
to reach the same goal – superior firm performance. 
The findings reveal that IT risks are categorised as 
vulnerabilities stemming from firms’ offline activities, while 
cyber risks are considered third-party intrusions. Moreover, the 
results highlight that cyber risks are still far from being 
considered more than mere technological issues and stress the 
need to go beyond the traditional risk management process. 
Therefore, the study proposes a framework grounded in the 
dynamic capabilities theory for managing cyber risk through a 
holistic approach in the protection of value creation. In 
particular, the study advances the notion that cyber risks are not 
merely a matter of technological measures to be adopted. Cyber 
risks require the development of strong dynamic capabilities to 
better sense emerging cyber threats and to develop the resilience 
and capacity to continuously adjust and adapt strategic 
directions to keep creating value for a company, despite external 
and internal threats. Thus, for cyber risk issues, the study 
confirms the need to improve the ‘sensing, seizing, and 
transforming’ capabilities suggested by the pillars of the 
dynamic capabilities theory (Teece et al, 2016; Teece, 2007; 
Winter, 2003; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997). In particular, dynamic capabilities should involve 
the identification, development, co-development and assessment 
of technological threats; the investment of resources to address 
threats while capturing value (‘seizing’); and the promotion of 
evolution (‘transforming’ or ‘shifting’) (Teece & Leih, 2016; 
Teece et al., 2016; Fawcett et al., 2011;). The aforementioned 
framework highlights a link rarely explored before: the role of 
13 
 
firmal and managerial implications when guiding an enterprise 
under conditions of emergent risks. 
 
Gaudenzi, B., & Siciliano, G. (2018). Managing IT and 
Cyber Risks in SC. In SC Risk Management (pp. 85-96). 
Springer, Singapore 
 
The second study was published as a chapter in SC Risk 
Management, published by Springer in 2018. The research was 
developed in collaboration with Prof. Barbara Gaudenzi, who 
supervised the entire publication process. 
The research question the study aims to address is: When and 
how does cyber risk affect the continuity and vulnerability of the 
SC? 
The study aims to fill a gap in the SC and risk management 
literature where there seems to be scarce theoretical frameworks 
that link risk-management processes to cyber risk throughout the 
SC. Therefore, an SCRM framework is provided that considers 
how to assess and mitigate cyber risks and failures, such as 
piracy and theft, product shortages and safety and security, 
across SC processes. 
Moreover, the chapter fills the gap in the current literature about 
how the characteristics of companies comprising the SC 
influence cyber risk management. In fact, most risk management 
literature shares the idea that small and mid-sized companies 
lack the awareness, resources and skills to prevent and mitigate 
cyber activities, while larger firms might be more effective in 
tackling these emergent risks (Berry & Berry, 2018; Low, 2017; 
Epstein, 2014). Moreover, the European Political Strategy 
Centre (2017) stresses that there is a lack of information on the 
status quo of cyber security among European companies, in 
contrast to other countries such as the US. The report highlights 
how this under-reporting ‘represents a major hurdle to better 
understanding and addressing cyber threats and provides scope 
for new vulnerabilities to spread more widely’ (European 
Political Strategy Centre, 2017, p.4). 
In consideration of the above insights, the study aims to 
investigate whether size is relevant for not only cyber risk 
management in a single company but also when the unit of 
analysis is the risk management process of the entire SC. 
Moreover, it focuses on Europe to unveil the state of cyber 
security. Thus, the sample involves European companies and 
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their SCs. In particular, it includes one small, local company 
with a revenue under €1 million and between 10 and 100 
employees; seven mid-sized companies with revenues between 
€1 million and €500 million and less than 50,000 employees and 
that represent various interests internationally; and seven large 
companies with revenues exceeding €10 billion and more than 
50,000 employees, which were evenly distributed in their level 
of internationalization. 
Even though the study’s narrow focus on 15 companies 
precludes the generalization of its findings, some general 
outcomes may be obtained. In particular, it confirmed that from 
an SC perspective, cyber risk may dramatically affect SC 
business continuity and is not a mere technological issue. The 
results stress a lack of information sharing and visibility in the 
relationship between the focal firm and its suppliers as well as 
an insufficient number cyber risk measures implemented. As 
security investments made by one node of the business network 
can affect the security risk of the others, resulting in exposure at 
the business’s weakest link (Khan and Estay, 2015; Yang and 
Lui, 2014), the interdependency among firms exacerbates cyber 
risk issues in SCs. Another meaningful finding shows that 
managers perceive cyber risks as reputational threats toward 
customers. This is because a breach of personal information is 
considered less tolerable than threats to B2B partners. 
This study’s main contribution has been the design of a 
framework for managing cyber risk in SCs, adopting the 
following risk management measures. 
First, it suggests enhancing the levels of compliance with 
security regulations. In fact, a wide range of policies and 
procedures has been provided concerning the use of IT by all 
users and protections against external hackers. Compliance with 
policies such as COBIT, 2000; ISO 31000, ISO/IEC 27001 
(Biener et al., 2015; Mangalaraj et al., 2014; Mukhopadhyay et 
al., 2013; Shackelford, 2012; Von Solms, 2005) is considered an 
internationally accepted best practice to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of the 
company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, 
hardware, people, etc.), and it is therefore an essential 
requirement for good corporate governance. 
Failure to comply might exacerbate vulnerability and exposure 
to various drawbacks. In fact, the adoption of formal regulations 
would not only protect from cyber risks, but also prevent other 
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actors in the chain from adopting a negative attitude toward the 
non-compliant company. 
Second, the framework promotes the implementation of cyber 
risk assessment and prevention procedures that might include a 
cost-benefit analysis of the cyber risk exposure, assessing the 
current insurance coverage and systematically calculating the 
probabilities of a cyber event to detect and prevent attacks as 
they occur and, when possible, before the data breach can be 
launched ((Biener et al., 2015; Shackelford, 2012; 
Mukhopadhyay et al., 2013; Dondossola et al., 2009; Von 
Solms, 2005). 
This would require a revolution in SC security culture, as in 
every company, the back-office IT, maintenance, operations, 
consumer-facing systems, management, and the board would be 
involved. Moreover, it should strengthen cybersecurity 
capabilities, including identity and access management, data 
protection and encryption, design and application security and 
security awareness (PWC, 2016). 
Third, should a risk occur, the framework stresses the relevance 
of structured SC risk mitigation strategies. Some of the variables 
that enable risk mitigation are information sharing, aligning 
incentives and risk sharing (Christopher & Gaudenzi, 2015; 
Gaudenzi, 2009; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009), and the literature 
suggests these measures should not be used in isolation, but 
rather in concert one with one another (Faisal et al., 2006). 
Fourth, the framework underlines also the importance of IT 
governance, which is ‘the firmal capacity exercised by the 
Board, executive management and IT management to control the 
formulation and implementation of IT strategy and in this way 
ensure the fusion of business and IT’ (Mangalaraj et al., 2014; 
De Haes &Van Grembergen, 2004; Webb et al., 2006). 
In this context, the study highly recommends that managers 
better define and communicate the company’s level of appetite 
and tolerance for cyber risk. The presence of IT governance in 
the framework stresses the relevance of specific training 
programs for human resources at all levels. 
The implementation of the framework should lead to at least 
three advantages for the whole SC, namely strategic benefits, 
such as controlling the level of risk for the entire SC and 
standardising compliance to legal requirements; reputation 
protection, which would prevent reputation crises and reinforce 
cooperation and SC relationships; and business continuity, 
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which involves decreasing the severity of disruptions and 
controlling costs. 
The main contribution of the study is a framework relevant to 
both managers and academicians. From a practical perspective, 
the framework promotes a formal and systematic mitigation 
plan, suggests a strong commitment from top management and 
clarifies the company’s real risk appetite and tolerance. From an 
academic perspective, the proposed cyber risk management 
framework seems to fill a gap in the literature and addresses how 
systematic IT and cyber risk management may enhance the 
ability to share information and better manage SC processes. 
 
Giorgia G Siciliano, Ilenia Confente, Barbara Gaudenzi and 
Matthias Eickhoff (2017). Effects of data breaches from 
user-generated content: A corporate reputation analysis 
(under review for European Management Journal) 
 
The third study is under review for the European Management 
Journal, a flagship international scholarly journal with an impact 
factor of 2.608. The research was developed in collaboration 
with Prof. Barbara Gaudenzi, Prof. Ilenia Confente and Ph.D. 
candidate Matthias Eickhoff. 
The aim is to discover how reputational dimensions change 
before and after a cyber risk occurs as well as the differences 
among the types of data breaches and industries. 
Reputation is considered a strategic intangible asset for 
companies because it substantially contributes to a competitive 
advantage (Gatzert and Schmit, 2016; Gatzert, 2015; Rindova 
and Fombrun, 1999). 
However, gaining from connectivity without losing trust is a 
delicate balancing act (PWC, 2016) that a cyber breach may 
compromise. In fact, the Global Economic Crime Survey of 
2016 reports that reputational damage to both employees and 
external stakeholders is the most damaging effect of a cyber 
breach. 
Corporate reputation literature infers different dimensions 
composing a company’s reputation, which stem from the 
different perceptions of customers, suppliers, (potential) 
employees, investors and local communities (Eckert, 2017; 
Gatzert, 2015; Wepener and Boshoff, 2015; Walker, 2010; 
Walsh et al., 2009; Walsh and Beatty, 2007). 
While the negative influence of cyber risks on corporate 
17 
 
reputation seems clear, little is said about which reputational 
dimensions are mainly eroded by these threats or the effects of 
the redundancy of these scandals on social media. 
The study uses a mixed methods approach, following the 
suggestions of the recent literature (Golicic and Davis, 2012; 
Spens and Kovacs, 2012; Seuring, 2011) that encourage the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods within a 
single SC study to provide multiple perspectives on the 
phenomenon under investigation. In particular, the paper 
analyses 250,0000 social media posts generated by users, or 
user-generated content (UGC), for a sample of 35 data breach 
incidents between 2013 and 2016, triangulating a content 
analysis with the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) analysis. This 
latter method is part of the topic model methods and is 
particularly fitting for the scope of the research. It allowed the 
researchers to ascertain the corporate latent reputation 
dimensions that consumers do not explicitly mention (Tirunillai 
and Tellis, 2014), but that are in fact the main topic of the social 
media posts they write. 
The literature review and data collection phase were conducted 
at the University of Göttingen, Faculty of Economic Sciences, 
under the supervision of Prof. Jan Muntermann, chair of 
electronic finance and digital markets. 
The results reveal that, compared with the antecedent period, a 
greater number of reputational dimensions emerged after critical 
events and provide key insights for academia and industry to 
understand large-scale data breaches and the reputational 
drawbacks after such critical incidents. 
This study provides both academic and practical contributions 
to the literature. With respect to the theoretical perspective, the 
study contributes to the crisis communication research field 
(Coombs and Holladay, 2002), risk management literature 
(Gatzert, 2015) and reputation research (Wepener and Boshoff, 
2015; Walsh et al., 2009; Walsh and Beatty, 2007), as it is one 
of the first studies to test corporate reputation dimensions in a 
data breach crisis context (Martin and Murphy, 2017; Martin et 
al., 2017). 
The managerial implications of this study lie both in the 
categorization of the main reputational drivers that managers 
should consider when designing a communication recovery 
response and in the suggestion of a methodology – an LDA 
analysis triangulated with a content and valence investigation – 
18 
 
that may be implemented to unveil the corporate reputation 
dimensions that emerge in rich UGC after a data breach. 
 
3. Research in progress 
 
Two research projects are in progress. 
With respect to the first, a study is currently being conducted to 
provide an illustrative case study of an firm’s practices in 
mitigating cyber risk and its influence on SC financial structures. 
The study aims to fill a gap in the literature regarding the 
integration of risk management and SC finance, an area that 
demands further definition and conceptual foundation 
(Gelsomino et al., 2016; Pfohl and Gomm, 2009; Wuttke et al., 
2013). 
The research is in collaboration with George Zsidisin, professor 
of SC management at Virginia Commonwealth University, and 
Prof. Barbara Gaudenzi. 
The study has been accepted for publication in SC Finance: 
Solutions for Financial Sustainability, Risk Management and 
Resilience in the SC, an edited collection published by Kogan 
Page. 
The second planned study is in collaboration with Prof. Jan 
Muntermann, chair of electronic finance and digital markets at 
the University of Göttingen. The study focuses on the public 
announcements firms release regarding the implementation of 
cyber risk management procedures after cyber breaches. In 
particular, it will investigate the impact of these announcements 
on UGC produced by customers on social media. The method of 
synthetic control will be used to construct a counterfactual 
(synthetic) brand to verify whether the implementation of the 
aforementioned measures positively contributes to restoring 
benevolent aspects in customer relationships, filling a gap in the 
marketing and management literature (Martin et al., 2017; 
Tirunillai and Tellis, 2017). 
 
4. Future research directions 
 
The literature needs further observations of when and how cyber 
data breaches affect relationships with stakeholders (Krafft et 
al., 2017; Rasoulian et al., 2017; Schneider et al., 2017; Stewart 
et al., 2017; Markos et al., 2016). In this context, I intend to 
conduct future research to develop a taxonomy of situational 
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factors that influence stakeholders’ behaviours and perceptions. 
A regression model may measure the impact of some 
contingences, such as the crisis history of an firm (Rasoulian et 
al., 2017) or the firm’s sharing of stakeholders’ data with 
externals partners (Schneider et al., 2017). Moreover, while the 
third study mentioned above focused on users’ perceptions after 
cyber-related scandals in European countries, it would be 
beneficial to expand the number of countries studied in order to 
ascertain whether there is a continuum of countries with 
different levels of cyber-related privacy concerns (Krafft et al., 
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1. Just do it. Managing IT and Cyber Risks to Protect the 
Value Creation 
Gaudenzi, B., & Siciliano, G 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how IT and cyber risks 
are currently perceived by companies. These risks may have 
critical impacts on the protection of organizational value 
creation in many industries. We developed a qualitative study, 
using a grounded-theory approach, involving European 
organizations. We elaborated the data through a fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The findings reveal 
that companies rely mainly on risk mitigation measures, 
showing little awareness about what these threats are. However, 
the fsQCA correlates an effective protection of value creation to 
a holistic IT and cyber risk management, together with a 




A survey conducted by PWC in 2014 (PWC, 2014) found 
that average financial losses attributed to Information 
Technology (IT) and cyber security incidents increased up 
to 18% in 2013 over the previous year, and big liabilities 
increased up to 51% over 2011. 
This information reveals that in today’s world, both internal 
IT risks and external cyber attacks may have critical impacts 




Solutions, 2015; Jajodia, Liu, Swarup, & Wang, 2010; Lee, 
Koo, & Nam, 2010; Mithas, Ramasubbu, & Sambamurthy, 
2011; Wang, Liang, Zhong, Xue, & Xiao, 2012). Aon 
(2015), in particular, ranked these risks as two of the major 
threats associated with rapid technological changes. 
However, as threats become more frequent and severe, 
investments in security initiatives seem to decrease (PWC 
Reports, 2015). 
The study is grounded in the dynamic capabilities 
perspective (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Teece, 2007), in order to 
analyze how relational, organizational, and technical 
capabilities should be integrated (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Teece, 2007) for better managing IT and cyber risks. 
In this perspective, authors highlighted that (risk) 
perceptions of individual actors in different functions of the 
organization should be well aligned to take good decisions 
(Ambrosini & Bowlman, 2009; Li & Liu, 2014; Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015). 
Considering the complexity and dynamism of IT and cyber 
risks (Leuprecht, Skillicorn, & Tait, 2016), their 
management require both technical e.g. software, insurance, 
investments in IT assets) and organizational (team work, 
human IT resources) capabilities (Lim, Stratopoulos, & 
Wirjanto, 2011; Mithas, Tafti, Bard- han, & Goh, 2012; 




protect the capability of the company to create value. 
To the best of our knowledge, in the management field there 
is a lack of investigation about how these new threats are 
currently   perceived   (J€arvel€ainen,   2013)   and   should   be 
managed to protect the value creation. In order to fill this 
gap, we developed an empirical research based on 15 
European organizations, using a fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Fiss, 2011). Results 
provide a picture of how managers perceive these risks with 
respect to the internal and external environment. Finally, the 
study proposes a managerial framework for deploying 
companies’ dynamic capabilities to manage IT and cyber 
risks. 
 
1. 2. Literature review 
 
1.2.1 Information technology and cyberspace 
In the literature of the last five years, the terms Information 
Technology (IT) and cyberspace have often been related 
(Melville, 2010; Sheriff, Bouchlaghem, El-Hama- lawi, & 
Yeomans, 2011; Ward, 2012) and sometimes used 
interchangeably (Mithas et al., 2011; Schryen, 2013; Smirnov, 
Sandkuhl, & Shilov 2013; Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). 
For example, Melville (2010) defined IT as the technological 
foundation of the information systems and cyberspace, Sheriff 
et al. (2011) considered IT an infrastructure, while, Schryen 




Cyberspace has been described as an integration of 
“complex networks into a global Internet” (Choucri & 
Goldsmith, 2012; Phister, 2010), characterized by low price 
of entry, anonymity, and asymmetries in vulnerability (Nye, 
2011). It has been defined as a synonym for IT (Smirnov et 
al., 2013) or for the “e-commerce space” (Lee et al., 2010). 
Others have considered hardware, software and data to be 
“cyber assets” (D’Amico, Buchanan, Goodall, & Walczak, 
2010). 
 
1.2.2 Managing IT and cyber risks to protect the value 
creation 
The Global State of Information Security Survey 2015 
(PWC Reports, 2015) found that, in 2015, there were 
117,339 incoming attacks per day, every day, consisting in 
events such as identity and intellectual property theft or 
competitors disrupting business to gain competitive 
advantage (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013; Bailey, 
Miglio, & Richter, 2014) Despite the complexity and recent 
evolution of the above- mentioned threats, cyber security has 
been only partially investigated in manage- ment studies, 
particularly in relation to social issues (Benson, Saridakis, 
& Tennakoon, 2014; Vladlena, Saridakis, Tennakoon, & 
Ezingeard, 2015), smart grids (Nazir, Hamdoun, Alzubi, & 
Alzubi, 2015)), data protection (Howell, 2015) and 




With respect to IT risks, the literature of the last five years has 
focused primarily on  technical solutions (J€arvel€ainen, 2013; 
Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2015; Tøndel, Meland, Omerovic, 
Gjære, & Solhaug, 2015, Leuprecht et al., 2016; Young, 
Lopez, Rice, Ram- sey, & McTasney, 2016), while 
investments in other security initiatives are decreasing 
(J€arvel€ainen, 2013). (When dealing with technological issues, 
the dynamic capability view suggests to integrate and 
orchestrate managerial capabilities with organizational and 
technical processes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; 
Kor& Mesko,2013, Vogel & Gu€ttel, 2013) in order to protect 
value in “rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, 
p. 516). The risk management literature suggests an effective 
protection towards dynamic key risks such as those related 
to information technology (Gaudenzi & Borghesi, 2006; 
Silva et al., 2014) and the cyberspace (Boyson, 2014) may be 
achieved through proper risk prevention, assessments, and 
mitigation. 
To examine these issues, we built an empirical study 
comprising leader European organizations, in order to 
conduct a preliminary investigation on the state of practice 
in managing IT and cyber risks. 
 
1.3 Methods and data 
 
1.3.1 The method 




Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) for interpreting the 
qualitative data collected in this study. 
It provides all the possible mix of inputs that lead to a desired 
outcome (Rihoux, 2006), which—in this study—means 
obtaining all the various combinations of risk assessment, risk 
prevention, risk mitigation, risk compliance and risk 
governance that may impact on the value creation. Values 
between 1 and 5 were assigned in order to obtain a single 
value representing the overall mean for both the input 
variables (the risk management measures) and the outcome 
variable (the financial performance, which is our selected 
proxy for the value creation). 
The subsequent calibration process (Ragin & Pennings, 
2005), provided the final fuzzy set scale, assuming the 
following continuous values: 0.05 for a low level of value 
creation, 0.50 for an average level of value creation, and 0.95 
for a high level of value creation, as shown in Table 1. 
 
1.3.2 Research sample and data collection 
 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the various 










The units of analysis are the firms’ IT and cyber risk practices 
of assessment, mitigation, and governance. An heterogeneous 
sample has been selected, for two reasons. First, similar dynamic 
capabilities can be better identified when the analysis is 
conducted with different companies (Ambrosini & Bowlman, 
2009). Second, heterogeneous samples allow a clearer 
observation (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010) capturing different 
viewpoints (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). 
The respondent we identified in each organization was the 
security manager or the risk manager at the director level. In 
consultant companies, we involved the IT risk consultant or 
business continuity consultant, who lead consultant projects 
within client firms. In all of the organizations, our key 
respondents were able to provide us with all the information 
needed to complete the questionnaires. We terminated the 
sampling process after achieving a point of theoretical saturation 
following our 15th interview. 




1.3.3 Variable descriptions 
At the best of our knowledge, the literature of the last 5 years 
does not provide sur- veys or items related to IT and cyber risk 
management. Thus, we were unable to test variables that were 
already present in academic studies. For this reason, we decided 
to propose a managerial framework, and to develop and test 
items mainly according to risk management literature and 
standards (ISO 31000, 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 
2010; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, Yildirim, Akalp, Aytac, & 
Bayram, 2011; Ifinedo, 2012; J€arvel€ainen, 2013; Boyson, 
2014; Feng, Wang, & Li, 2014; Silva et al., 2014; Biener et al., 
2015; ISO 27001, 2013). We also included 8 general questions 
to deepen interviewees’ answers (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). As 
shown in Table 3, we selected 14 items, describing 5 input 
variables, and 1 item indicating the output variable (financial 
performance). 
 
1.3.4 Fuzzy solution generation 
The use of a fsQCA software generates an evaluation of the 
potential relationships between an outcome (such as—in our 
case—the financial performance) and all the possible 
combinations of ‘predictors’ (the input variables) (Longest & 
Vaisey, 2008). The method also clusters input variables 











Table 2. Sample characteristics. 




toward that outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). We 
set the fsQCA software in order to generate solutions with 
the maximal level of parsimony, which means we did not 
considered some cases that may exist logically, but that have 
not been observed in the data (Rihoux, 2006). 
Finally, software results are evaluated considering how each 
solution can explain the dependent variable (Longest & 




1.4.1 Descriptive statistics: IT and cyber risk perceptions 
 
Our results show significantly different managers’ 
perceptions and meanings of the two types of risks. Looking 
at descriptive statistics, 40% of the sample believed that IT 
risks manifest in the “offline” world, impacting only internal 
dimensions (e.g., business continuity, compliance, and 
procedures) while cyber risks consist of intrusions from 
third parties through the web, emails, and smartphones. In 
some cases, these risks were not perceived as real threats, 
and hence not monitored. On the other hand, one out of three 
of the organizations considered cyber risks to be a 
subcategory of IT risks; these interviewees suggested that 
managing only the latter may be sufficient to protect against 
the former. 




cyber risk perceptions: risk and security managers showed 
to know the two types of risk, while half of the sample of IT 
corporate managers did not, with consequent scarce 
investments in training for employees at all levels. When 
discussing the relevance of managing both types of risks, a 
paradox emerges: while roughly 50% of the sample saw 
effective management as extremely relevant, one out of three 
managers admit- ted that their companies behaved as if they 
had very high risk appetites. 
 
1.4.2 Fuzzy analysis: Risk management solutions to protect 
the value creation 
Looking at the results emerged from the fuzzy analysis, it 
emerged that there are four possible ways in which the risk 
management process can generate value. Table 4 shows these 
using Ragin and Fiss’s (2008) notation system: each column 
represents a combination of conditions and a correlated 
outcome, such that full circles (●) indicate the presence of a 
condition and empty cross circles ( ) indicate its absence. 
Solution 1 suggests none of the above-mentioned measures 
impacts the protection of value creation of bigger and 
international companies; Solution 2 focuses on local, non- 
international companies, whose IT and cyber risk 
management strategies are limited to mitigation in cases of 
concrete threats; Solution 3 shows also international 




by the compliance to official information security standards; 
while Solution 4 proposes a complete IT and cyber risk 
management leads international companies to greater 
financial performance. However, among these, only the 
latter is able to explain the 32% of the value creation of 
companies, while, the others just the 0.6%. 
 
 




1.4.3 A proposed framework for managing IT and cyber risks 
In Table 5 we show how managers perceive and describe a 
good risk management process. All the respondents 
spontaneously highlighted that it should start with the 
systematic    identification   and  measurement   of potential 
sources of IT and cyber risks. 
Since risks can arise at any point in time, managers confirm 




and systematically updated to take into consideration the 
urgency—and, thus, the time pressure—related to each 
given risk (Ward, 1999). 
In Figure 1 we propose a framework for managing IT and 




This study answers to the call for a deeper understanding of 
IT and cyber-related issues at a more granular level (Bauer & 
Bernroider, 2015; Acun~a, 2016), by considering all types of 
 




event (malicious vs. accidental), their sources (internal vs. 
external) and the perceptions companies have about their 







The fsQCA results reveal there are four ways in which risk 
management measures can be combined to enhance the 
value protection. 
The best solution is reached when the entire IT and cyber 
risk management process is put in place. 
A second option suggests that international companies that 
do not implement any risk management measure have still 
acceptable results. This is probably due to the high level of 




and their widespread geographic presence, which may 
mitigate the impacts of some manifestations of IT or cyber 
threats. However, the importance of an holistic IT and cyber 
risk management process suggests that international 
companies are nowadays still relying on “parachutes,” which 
may become insufficient soon. 
With respect to the last two solutions, they massively rely on 
some risk mitigation strategy, primarily insurance and 
technical solutions. One possible interpretation of these results 
is that such companies operate instable industries that rarely 
experienced IT or cyberspace breaches. However, the always 
increasing number of breaches sug- gests that IT and cyber 
risks will play as a “black swan”: though they may not be an 
everyday challenge, when they do manifest, they are difficult to 
recover from. 
In conclusion, our results contradict studies that focus 
merely on technical solution, such as technological 
approaches (Leuprecht et al., 2016) and insurance (Biener et 
al., 2015; Tøndel et al., 2015, Young et al., 2016). In fact, 
while technical solutions are surely important to protect the 
value creation, the findings seem to confirm the existing 
literature on the dynamic capability view which highlights the 
relevance of a major integration among relational, 
organizational, and technical capabilities (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007) when dealing with technological 




achieved implementing a system- atic risk management 
process, reactive to the dynamic nature of IT and cyber risks, 
as suggested by Boyson (2014), Biener et al. (2015), and 
Teece et al. (2016). 
Moreover, we found that a thorough management of IT and 
cyber risks may protect the value creation in any type of 
industries, in line with that part of the literature that states 
dynamic capabilities exhibit commonalities across different 
firms in terms of efficiency and value creation (Peteraf, Di, 
Stefano, & Verona, 2013; Breznik & Hisrich, 2014; Di 
Stefano, Peteraf, & Verona, 2014). 
The findings also propose organizations should foster 
radical changes to company culture, confirming the learning 
process as a core topic of the dynamic capabilities view 
(Vogel & Gu€ttel, 2013). In fact, there seems to exist a general 
lack of knowledge and awareness across employees at 
different levels (e.g., corporate and local) about what IT and 
cyber risks are. This seems to require a more open 
communication and a clear leadership about the 
management of IT and cyber risks. 
1.6 Conclusions 
The most important strategic action regarding IT and cyber 
risks for to protect value creation of both multinational and 
local companies seems to be the implementation of a holistic 
IT and cyber security management system. Information 




investments to create a common culture among employees 
at all levels can help managers enhance the creation of value 
in the long term. Effective IT and cyber risk management 
yields critical advantages; thus, its implementation should 
rely on scientific research. 
This study contains a number of limitations that may be 
addressed in future research. First, the limited number of 
companies does not allow generalizability. Future research 
could use a wider sample, in terms of company size, location 
and type of industry. Second, while our suggestion to 
implement an IT and cyber risk management and to foster a 
deeper cross-functional communication has its merits, 
future efforts should investigate which are the specific 
mechanisms to put in place from a dynamic capability 
perspective. 
Third, we focused on the IT and cyber risk management 
impact on one dimension, namely the protection of the value 
creation. However, other aspects, such as the reputation, 
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2. Managing IT and Cyber Risks in Supply Chains 
 




This chapter describes the potential impact of Information 
Technology (IT) and Cyber risks on the continuity and 
vulnerabilities of the supply chain. We propose a theoretical 
framework and direction to help organizations to manage these 
risks. The evidence gleaned from an empirical investigation will 
illustrate how organizations actually perceive, control, and 
manage IT and Cyber risks within the supply chains. The 
findings will underline that managers tend to invest in few 
mitigation strategies; hence, they take risks that are much higher 
than their declared risk appetites. In addition, managers 
denounce a general lack of awareness regarding the effects that 
IT and Cyber risks may have on supply operations and 
relationships. 
 
Keywords: IT risk, Cyber risk, security, supply chain risk 
management 
 
2.1. IT risks and Cyber risks: real threats for all supply chains 
 
 
Global trends, such as digitalization and servitization, have 
caused an evolution in all conventional supply chains whose 




to a network of interconnected processes, which are strongly 
oriented toward flexibility, efficiency, and resilience. 
In this context, Internet platforms assure operational benefits, 
such as cost reduction, inventory pooling, postponement, a 
reduction of the bullwhip effect, and shorter lead times, to allow 
for faster information sharing across different organizations. For 
example, supply chain leaders such as Wal-Mart, Warnier- 
Lambert, Procter & Gamble, and Levi Strauss, have achieved 
great benefits from their investments in Information Technology 
(IT) tools such as the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). In 
particular, these companies have improved their performances 
in demand planning and scheduling production, which have 
created better coordination with their key suppliers. 
However, the use of IT tools and Internet platforms generates 
new forms of supply chain vulnerability and new risks, which 
may affect the supply chain’s continuity and performance. 
Managers should recognize these new threats as critical issues, 
that may exacerbate the other supply chain risks throughout 
interdependencies (Gaudenzi and Borghesi, 2006). However, 
recent reports (PWC Report, 2014; PWC, 2015a) show that the 
awareness of these risks is still low: among security incidents 
across geographic regions, IT and Cyber breaches are rising 
significantly in Europe, which reported a 41% jump over the 
previous year. Thus, supply chain managers need to focus more 




by IT tools, such as ERP or any vertical software, and external 
Cyberspace. 
 
2.2 How external Cyberspace and IT tools generate risks 
 
 
A McKinsey report (Bailey et al., 2014) considers 
“Cyberattacks” to be events such as fraud, identity or intellectual 
property theft, and political statements made by hacktivists. A 
PWC report (2015b) sees IT as a tool and an enabler of seamless 
and real-time interconnectivity across the entire network. 
Part of the literature considers the two risks related and even 
occasionally exchangeable. Both are not easily predictable, and 
they always imply a violation of three key properties: 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity. 
Some authors consider IT as the foundation of Cyberspace 
(Melville, 2010), while others consider it a mere infrastructure, 
where hardware, software, and external data represent “Cyber 
assets” (D’Amico et al., 2010). Cyberspace is typically 
considered an external environment with low entry barriers, 
which have an ambiguity characterized by a certain risk 
exposure. 
In practice, IT risks seem strictly technical: they stem from 
failures of ERP/IT systems and impact only on the flow of 
information itself. Here, the control of technical features and 




Cyber risks go beyond mere IT disruptions; they are linked to 
human Cyberattacks, where hackers intentionally access an 
organization or a network with the goal of either gaining an 
economic advantage or causing sabotage. These actions are 
typically linked to Cyber bullying, Cyber terrorism, or political 
issues (Garfinkel, 2012; von Solms and van Niekerk, 2013). 
In 2014, McKinsey found that, while IT and Cyber-related 
breaches are occurring with growing regularity, executives 
perceive that they are not quickly responding with adequate 
tools (Bailey et al., 2014). In the Global Risk Management 
Report (Aon, 2015), “Cyberattacks” were listed in the top 10 
threatening risks for organizations and networks. 
Despite these perceptions, Cyber security and IT security remain 
the areas of risk management with the largest gap between the 
level of threat and the amount of resources invested. Several 
studies (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010; Kong et al., 2012; Gao and 
Zhong, 2015; Gao et al., 2015; PWC Report, 2015a) have 
revealed that, as these threats become more frequent and severe, 
investments in security initiatives decrease. Even with this 
attention on IT and Cyber security management, recent literature 
has mainly focused on managerial perceptions, technical 
aspects, or legislative perspectives (Ellison and Woody, 2010; 
Ozkan and Karabacak, 2010; Huang et al., 2011; Markmann et 
al., 2012; Brender and Markov, 2013; Mukhopadhyay et al., 
2013; Yang et al., 2013; Biener et al., 2015). From the supply 




investigated the impacts of IT risks and Cyber risks on supply 
chains (Olson and Wu, 2010; Järveläinen, 2013; Bartol, 2014; 
Boyson, 2014; Khan and Estay, 2015; Gaudenzi and Siciliano, 
2016). 
Therefore, supply chain managers should carefully focus on two 
critical points: 
1. Information security should not be considered as a 
technology investment itself. Instead, decisions should 
be made that involve all the actors in the supply chain, 
create an awareness about IT and Cyber risks, and define 
clear procedures to identify these threats to protect the 
supply chain from these vulnerabilities. 
2. Managing IT and Cyber risks may increase the overall 
performance, which will augment the sharing of 
information and collaboration as well as the efficient 
management of processes across the supply chain. 
 
2.3 Managing IT and Cyber risks in supply chains: A practical 
framework 
 
We propose a supply chain risk management framework that 
may guide managers to assess and manage IT and Cyber risks in 
protecting supply chain processes. We addressed key risks, such 
as IT failures, piracy and thefts, product shortages, safety and 
security, inventory levels, and supplier dependence, which may 




performances of all actors in a supply chain. Nonetheless, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are very few theoretical 
frameworks (Khan and Estay, 2015) that link the supply chain 
risk management process to IT and Cyber risks throughout the 
entire value chain. 
To fill this gap, we adapted a framework based on Fawcett et al. 
(2011), whose objective was to study the effective deployment 
of IT by analyzing why some types of investments are more 
successful than others. We aimed to enlarge the abovementioned 
scope by considering how systematic IT and Cyber risk 
management may enhance the ability to share information and 
better manage supply chain processes. The proposed framework 
is shown in Figure 1, and represents how the key steps of a risk 
management process (risk assessment, risk treatment, risk 
governance, and risk compliance) should be adapted to IT and 
Cyber risks. 
A robust IT and Cyber risk management program may protect 
the strategic goals of the supply chain, preventing business 
disruptions and protecting the reputation of all actors involved. 
Firstly, managing IT and Cyber risks would have the strategic 
benefits of enhancing the firms’ capability to guarantee a 
tolerable level of overall risk for all actors involved and 
consistently do so within their real risk appetite. Thus, managers 
should monitor if and how IT and Cyber risks may threaten 
relevant assets and relationships with upstream and downstream 




Secondly, IT failures, piracy, thefts, and Cyberattacks are listed 
among the major causes of reputation crises and losses of 
reputation value. Protecting the supply chain against those risks 
requires stable relationships amongst supply chain members and 
fostering collaboration. 
 




Thirdly, IT failures and Cyberattacks may cause business 
interruptions, which in turn may damage suppliers’ and 
customers’ operational and financial performances. 
The risk management process should therefore start with a 
careful assessment of the sources of IT and Cyber risks amongst 
all supply chain members. In companies that lack awareness of 
these risks, the role of the “channel captain” is essential. These 
supply chain leaders should, for example, lead supply chain risk 
management projects or include them in their contractual 
agreements or sourcing strategies’ ad hoc requirements 




After the assessment (identification, measurement, and 
evaluation) of these risks, each supply chain member should 
decide the nature and amount of investments in risk prevention 
strategies, such as investments in hardware and software, which 
they plan to implement. Risk mitigation strategies reduce the 
severity of disruptions, control costs, and assure continuity of 
supplies. Risk mitigation comprises both financial controls (IT 
and Cyber risk insurance programs) and physical controls 
(investing in access control, secure areas, equipment security 
levels). 
This framework offers a holistic risk management process, in 
which the abovementioned strategies, processes, technologies, 
and human resources should be aligned in coherence with the 
governance of each organization and of the supply chain as a 
whole. Several variables will influence the implementation of 
the risk management process such as the position of the supply 
chain captain (i.e., a manufacturer or a retailer), strategic 
priorities (i.e., efficiency vs. responsiveness), the 
industry/markets (there are different security standards to 
conform to, such as ISO/IEC 27001:2013, depending on the 
sector/markets), and organizations’ dimensions. The final result 
should be a supply chain where the actors share more 
information throughout the whole process, which guarantees 
strategic benefits, reputation protection, and business continuity. 
Notably, empirical studies have demonstrated that IT-enabled 




integration and agility, which has a positive impact on 
operational, strategic, and financial performances (Trkman et 
al., 2010; Dewan and Ren, 2011; Giannakis and Louis, 2011; 
Mithas et al., 2011; Tallon and Pinsonneault, 2011; Prajogo and 
Olhager, 2012; PWC Report 2015b). Thus, companies that show 
a real commitment to safeguarding the entire value chain from 
IT and Cyber risks have greater control over the supply chain’s 
level of risk, build solid reputations, and assure business 
continuity. 
 
2.4 Practical evidence from a European sample of companies 
 
 
Recent literature has poorly investigated the perceptions and 
decision-making processes regarding the management of IT and 
Cyber risks within the supply chain (Benlian and Hess, 2011; 
Yildirim et al., 2011; Pezderka and Sinkovics, 2011). This led 
us to conduct an empirical investigation of European 
organizations that rely on security and risk management 
standards in order to choose the drivers of systematic IT and 
Cyber risk management (risk assessment, risk prevention, risk 









Table 1. IT and Cyber risk management constructs 
 
 




- Identification and measurement of key risks 
such as: 
- Inadvertent breaches 
- Deliberate attacks 
- Asset thefts 
- Equipment failures 
- Backup failures 
- Data thefts 
- Site disasters 
- Copyright infringements 
- Presence of a dedicated budget for IT security 
management 
- Investments in risk assessment consulting 
projects 
Yildirim, E. et al. (2011) 
Biener, C. et al. (2015) 
Järveläinen, J. (2013) 
Risk Prevention 
 
- Investments in hardware tools 
- Investments in software solutions integrated 
with other IT systems 
Ifinedo, P. (2012) 
Järveläinen, J. (2013) 
Yildirim, E. et al. (2011) 
Biener, C. et al. (2015) 
Boyson, S. (2014) 
Silva, M. et al. (2014) 
Risk Mitigation 
 
- Financial control solutions (insurance) 
- Physical control solutions (access controls, 
secure areas, and equipment security levels) 
 
Biener, C. et al. (2015) 
Silva, M. et al. (2014) 




 Yildirim, E. et al. (2011) 
Risk Governance 
- Defining the organization’s risk appetite and Järveläinen, J. (2013) 
tolerance Yildirim, E. et al. (2011) 
- Investments in ad hoc training programs in Boyson, S. (2014) 
security Ifinedo, P. (2012) 
- Investments in organizational human resources Johnston, A. et al. (2010) 
(risk manager, security manager, etc.) Biener, C. et al. (2015) 
Risk Compliance 
- Perception of the organization regarding Yildirim, E. et al. (2011) 
exposure and vulnerability toward IT and Cyber Ifinedo, P. (2012) 
risks Bulgurcu, B. et al. (2010) 
- Risk appetite of an organization Feng, N., et al. (2014) 
 Biener, C., et al. (2015) 
 Boyson, S. (2014) 
 
To investigate whether or not the perceptions and management 
of these risks vary, depending on the industry, performance, and 
globalization choices of organizations, we considered 
heterogeneity with regard to the industries they operate in, their 
size, and their level of internationalization (Martin and 
Eisenhardt, 2010). The sample involved several European 
companies including: one small, local company, with a revenue 
under €1 million, which had between 10 and 100 employees; 
seven medium companies, with revenues between €1 million 
and €500 million, less than 50 thousand employees, and that 




companies, which were evenly distributed throughout their level 
of internationalization, with revenues exceeding €10 billion and 
more than 50 thousand employees. 
We interviewed more than one key informant, including CEOs, 
supply managers, risk managers, and/or IT managers, within the 
same organization to consider whether or not their role might 
impact the way IT and Cyber risks are seen and faced. This 
process allowed us to reach the point of theoretical saturation 
with fifteen organizations. 
Some evidences from our research are summarized in Table 2. 
The sample revealed that managing IT risks and Cyber risks 
positively influences reputation toward both the upstream and 
downstream actors of the supply chain. However, the 
commitment to managing these risks and protecting reputation 
varied by the dependence of the supply chain under observation: 
IT and Cyber risk management toward the upstream supply 
chain was almost non-existent, while a higher commitment was 
seen toward clients and customers. In fact, managers perceived 
breaches to private and personal information as less tolerable 
than threats to business-to-business partners. 
 
Table 2. Some evidences from the interviews 
 
IT and Cyber C1: When we analyze risks, what we measure is 
Risk Assessment the reputational damage. We also address the 
 economic damage for the company, but the 
 reputational damage is our priority, as it is 





 C2: We assess risks through daily antivirus 
scanning and we keep ourself updated about the 
possible IT and Cyber risks through specialized 
journals and blogs. 
 
C1: In the last 24 months we suffered from 
inadvertent breaches, deliberate attack, asset 
theft, equipment failure, backup failure, 
copyright and compliance infringement. We 
focus our risk assessment on these risks. 
IT and Cyber 
Risk Prevention 
C7: We do not have a dedicated budget for IT 
and Cyber risk prevention. The problem is that 
there are urgent needs, and we invest only on 
emergencies. In this way, sometimes we spend 
more than we would if we were investing in 
formal prevention plan. 
 
C3: We get there only when it is too late, when 
the damage has been done. There is little 
strategy and a lot of tactics, and little 
prevention. 
 
C14: Only a careful training could improve the 
efficacy and the efficiency of the IT Risk 
Prevention. 
IT and Cyber 
Risk Mitigation 
C2: The back-up procedures (for IT risk) are 
formal and these are able to reconstruct the 
history of up to three years. The back-up is on 
a daily base, business continuity is excellent. 
The disaster recovery is great and there are two 
separate sites. However all of this is just for IT 
risks, not cyber risks. 
 
C4: On average we realize we had an intrusion 
180 days later, and between 70% and 80% of 
internal fraud are discovered only by 
informers. So our mitigation strategy is not 
efficient yet. 
IT and Cyber 
Risk Compliance 
C8: We decided not to follow some specific 
Information Security Standard. We just follow 
our best practices. 
66 
 





Strategic and operational advantages related to careful IT and 
Cyber risk management currently lack acknowledgement. Thus, 
managers usually neither stipulate contractual agreements with 
key suppliers nor implement systematic plans for disaster 
recovery, business continuity, or the backup of sensitive data. 
Moreover, there is a low commitment at the corporate level: risk 
and security managers show a greater awareness about IT and 
Cyber risks, while top managers do not prioritize their 
management. The consequence is a scarce effort in building a 
deeper awareness among employees through systematic 
training. 
Regarding risk assessment, IT and Cyber risks were 
systematically assessed by more than half of the sample, who 
also had a dedicated budget. However, the identification and 
measurement of key risks appeared to be far from effective: 
C7: The Risk Manager is also responsible for 
IT risk, but he cannot be good in everything! 
He assigns priorities to the problems to solve. 
 
C15: Top managers consider themselves 
completely risk adverse. Nonetheless, they do 
not care sufficiently about IT risks. 
 
C2: We do not have systematic training on IT 
and Cyber Risk Management. We rely just on 
our perceptions. 
 
C7: The IT manager is not in the management 
committee, and his language is too technical to 





three out of four of the respondents had faced some IT and Cyber 
breaches in the last 24 months. 
Investments in risk assessment consulting projects were low for 
the majority of larger, multinational organizations, which used 
consultancy “on demand” for testing protection systems 
(penetration intrusion test), disaster recovery, and backup 
systems. 
Regarding risk treatment, mitigation strategies were widely 
used, even if the majority was exclusively dedicated to IT risks. 
More than half of the sample had a budget solely dedicated to 
software, hardware, insurance, physical entry controls, secure 
areas, and equipment security levels. Interestingly, managers 
appeared genuinely convinced that effective IT and Cyber risk 
management was possible solely through these types of 
investments. Risk prevention rarely accounted for ad hoc 
investments by most of the organizations. Thus, they seemed 
somewhat disoriented by the breaches from which they suffered; 
a third of the sample admitted that companies tend to be high- 
risk takers, with a dramatic number of IT and Cyber breaches 
discovered roughly six months after the fact. 
In general, risks were assessed by only one out of three 
organizations. Interestingly, the majority of them were medium 
and small companies, which invested in protection, disaster 
recovery, and backup consultancy services. The only exception 
to this trend was represented by multinational operations in the 




assessment consulting projects. However, they often required 
consultancy services exclusively to assess Cyber risks and rarely 
for IT risks. 
Efforts in IT and Cyber risk prevention were performed 
systematically by all the multinational companies and by the 
small organization, which operates in the software industry. As 
mentioned earlier, roughly all the sample companies 
implemented systematic mitigation strategies. The only striking 
exceptions were the small organization and all those operating 
in the healthcare industry. 
The majority of the medium and small companies perceived low 
exposure and vulnerability toward IT and Cyber risks, while risk 
appetite was declared to be very low throughout all companies 
and industries. Roughly all the companies invested in ad hoc 
training programs in security, but they were only directed 
toward the risk and security managers, never to all the 
employees. 
In general, finance and high technology industries showed the 
most careful and systematic IT and Cyber risk management 






The pervasive use of Internet throughout the entire value chain 




in terms of resilience. To investigate how companies in practice 
perceive IT and Cyber risks and whether they include them in 
their decision-making process, we conducted an exploratory 
survey among different European companies, leaders in their 
industries. The findings show a lack of awareness at different 
organizational levels. Employees seem to be unprepared to deal 
with these risks and with their effects onto processes and 
operations. From the top management perspective, managers 
seem to dedicate insufficient efforts and investments particularly 
in IT and Cyber risk mitigation strategies, mainly using reactive 
approaches instead of proactive ones. 
The proposed risk management framework seems to fill an 
existing gap in the literature, addressing how systematic IT and 
Cyber risk management may enhance the ability to share 
information and better manage supply chain processes. From a 
practitioner perspective, the framework addresses those risks – 
such as IT failures, piracy and thefts, product shortages, safety 
and security, inventory over-stocks, and supplier dependence – 
which may significantly affect supply chain performances. In 
practice, this approach may guide managers to formally assess 
and manage IT and Cyber risks in order to protect supply chain 
processes. Moreover, the framework promotes a formal 
mitigation plan to update systematically, in order to respond to 
IT and Cyber risks, considering the time pressure these new 
threats impose to all the actors of the supply chain. These risk 




commitment from top management, especially in conforming to 
the ad hoc security standards and the definition of the real risk 
appetite and tolerance of the company. Managers should also be 
engaged in promoting an overall “IT and Cyber culture” 
transversally in the entire supply chain, because IT and Cyber 
risks represent significant threats for both the upstream and 
downstream supply chain. 
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3. Effects of data breaches from user-generated content: A 
corporate reputation analysis 




This paper investigates the effects of data breaches on corporate 
reputation. Prior research indicates that these new and 
unpredictable threats may have significant drawbacks for vital 
corporate dimensions. Further, in the Industry 4.0 era, the 
redundancy of these scandals on social media can exacerbate 
negative effects. In this context, the study conducted Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation analysis on social media user-generated 
content for a sample of 35 firms in nine industries that had a data 
breach incident between 2013 and 2016. The aim was to 
discover how reputational dimensions changed before and after 
these critical events, as well as the differences among the types 
of data breaches and industries. 
The results reveal that, compared with the antecedent period, 
more reputational dimensions emerged after critical events. 
Three of these dimensions—perceived quality, customer 
orientation and corporate performance—emerged for all three 
types of breach. However, if there was a identified responsible 
party for the data breach, users focused more on the role of 
firms’ human resources management, whereas if users did not 





These findings provide key insights for the research and industry 
to understand large-scale data breaches and reputational 
drawbacks after such incidents. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Reputation, Data Breach, User- 




Reputation is considered a strategic intangible asset for 
companies because it substantially contributes to giving them a 
competitive advantage (Gatzert, 2015; Gatzert & Schmit, 2016; 
Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). 
Data breaches represent a significant threat to companies’ 
reputation. Cybercrime has become the second most reported 
cause of economic crime (KPMG, 2016; PwC, 2016). For 
example, in May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack seized 
hundreds of thousands of computer systems around the world 
(Sanger, Chan, & Scott, 2017). Recently, marketing studies 
(Ferrell, 2017; Hille, Walsh, & Cleveland, 2015; Kashmiri, 
Nicol, & Hsu, 2017; Martin & Murphy, 2017; Martin, Borah, & 
Palmatier, 2017) and management studies (Kude, Hoehle, & 
Sykes, 2017; Gatzert, 2015; Gatzert & Schmit, 2016) have 
focused their attention on such events. 
Data breaches are unpredictable, often low-probable and high- 
impacting, like “black swans” (Gaudenzi & Siciliano, 2017), 
and they can be categorized into three groups (Sen & Borle, 




stealing customers’ data), unintentional and internal (e.g., 
incorrect security settings that expose private information), and 
external and intentional (e.g., ransomware infecting companies’ 
software). 
In this context, the Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT) (Coombs, 2007, 2016) assumes that corporate 
reputation can be threatened by crises through the creation of 
negative perceptions (Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 
2002). To capture and to understand such perceptions online 
data analysis provide a global and valuable feedback (Wang, 
Wan, Zhang, Li, & Zhang, 2016). In particular, user-generated 
content (UGC) (Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014), which is defined as 
content that is created and shared by users (Kumar, Bezawada, 
Rishika, Janakiraman, & Kannan, 2016), is considered a valid 
representation of the “wisdom of the crowds” (Tirunillai & 
Tellis, 2014, p. 464). 
Few marketing and management studies have examined the 
effect of different data breaches (Kashmiri et al., 2017) on vital 
corporate dimensions, such as reputation (Ferrell, 2017; 
Manworren, Letwat, & Daily, 2016), in different industries 
(Kashmiri et al., 2017; Sen & Borle, 2015). 
To fill this gap, this study’s three research questions focus on 
consumers’ reactions to data breaches by analysing UGC 




What is the main UGC topic related to company reputation 
dimensions? Do the dimensions vary after data 
breaches? If so, how? 
How does UGC related to company reputation dimensions 
vary depending on the type of data breach? 
How does UGC related to company reputation dimensions 
change in relation to different industries? 
The unit of analysis in this study is UGC around companies, 
which was analysed using the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
automated method (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2002). Potential 
implications of LDA in management research have been studied 
recently (George, Osinga, Lavie, & Scott, 2016) and adopted by 
marketing studies to ascertain implicit and intangible 
dimensions such as quality (Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014), 
consumers’ attitudes and behaviour in social media (Langley, 
Hoeve, Ortt, Pals, & van der Vecht, 2014; Zhang, Moe, & 
Schweidel, 2017) and purchase predictions (Jacobs, Donkers, & 
Fok, 2016). 
In addition, qualitative data analysis was implemented to 
ascertain the content and valence characterizing the dimensions 
extracted through the LDA analysis. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
a literature review of the main concepts of corporate reputation, 
data breaches, UGC and SCCT. Sections 3 and 4 describe the 




and implications, and Section 6 discusses limitations and future 
research directions. 
 
3.2 Literature review and theoretical development 
 
3.2.1 Corporate reputation 
 
Fombrun (2012) highlighted that “a corporate reputation is a 
collective assessment of a company’s attractiveness to a specific 
group of stakeholders relative to a reference group of companies 
with which the company competes for resources” (p. 100). Thus, 
reputation is largely perceived as a multidimensional construct 
in which perceptions of customers, suppliers, (potential) 
employees, investors and local communities converge (Eckert, 
2017; Gatzert, 2015). In line with this stream of literature, Walsh 
and Beatty (2007), Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson and Beatty (2009), 
and Wepener and Boshoff (2015) recommended further 
investigation of customers’ perceptions, which are the primary 
and most challenging revenue driver. 
Reputation has been described as a fragile construct because of 
potential adverse changes in stakeholders’ perceptions (Gatzert, 
2015). Reputation is largely considered an asset that is exposed 
to several risks, and companies consider reputational risk in their 
risk management agenda (Gaudenzi, Confente, & Christopher, 
2015). 
Gatzert (2015) categorized the events that may damage 




Eckert (2017) noted that there is a lack of in-depth understanding 
of the effect of stakeholders’ perceptions on the different 
dimensions of corporate reputation in the case of critical events. 
 
3.2.2 Data breaches 
 
Access to consumers’ personal information enables firms to 
better personalize products and services (Hofacker, Malthouse, 
& Sultan, 2016), as well as prices (Wedel & Kannan, 2016). 
However, this access has led to firms facing new threats, which 
are represented by data breaches that may stem from external 
and intentional attacks (KPMG, 2016), as well as employees 
(PwC, 2016). 
While a growing number of firms in various industries (KPMG, 
2016; Martin & Murphy, 2017; PwC, 2016) have suffered from 
data breaches, the literature seems to focus on single incidents; 
thus, broader investigations are needed (Kashmiri et al., 2017; 
Knittel & Stango, 2014). 
The literature on information systems and management 
highlights the relevance of investments in enhancing technical 
preventive measures (August, Niculescu, & Shin, 2014; 
Järveläinen, 2013; Nazareth & Choi, 2015), protecting data 
privacy (Martin & Murphy, 2017) and boosting cultural change 
(Gaudenzi & Siciliano, 2017). Moreover, studies in 
management and risk propose reputation risk insurance 




2011). However, efforts towards mitigation strategies often 
remain partially implemented because of the lack of a holistic 
understanding of the damage caused by data breaches on firms. 
Thus, there is a need to investigate the erosion of firms’ 
reputations (Ferrell, 2017) across industries (Kashmiri et al., 
2017; Sen & Borle, 2015), as well as types of data breaches 
(Kashmiri et al., 2017). 
 
3.2.3 Social media 
 
Social media includes platforms where big data can be analysed 
in high volume, velocity and variety (Hofacker et al., 2016). Big 
data represents a twofold channel of interaction whereby firms 
can post firm-generated content (Kumar et al., 2016; Kumar, 
Choi, & Greene, 2017) and customers can create and share UGC 
with firms and people (Kumar et al., 2016; Tang, Fang, & Wang, 
2014; Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014). 
Studies have investigated customers’ motivations in creating 
UGC (Presi, Saridakis, & Hartmans, 2014; Sun, Dong, & 
McIntyre, 2017), the change in users’ perceptions following 
exposure to UGC (Marchiori & Cantoni, 2015), and the 
credibility of travel-related UGC such as TripAdvisor (Ayeh, 
Au, & Law, 2013) and restaurant recommendations (Salehi- 
Esfahani, Ravichandran, Israeli, & Bolden, 2016), as well as 
customers’ propensity and involvement to post online (Ahn, 
Duan, & Mela, 2015; Shriver, Nair, & Hofstetter, 2013), engage 




Calder, Kim, & Vandenbosch, 2016) and make purchase 
decisions online (Ludwig et al., 2013). 
In relation to UGC as a tool to measure firms’ dimensions, 
studies have ascertained implicit and intangible dimensions such 
as quality (Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014), predicted purchases 
(Jacobs et al., 2016), users’ behaviour (Thakur, Summey, & 
John, 2013), quantified firms’ return on sales (Kumar et al., 
2016; Leeflang, Verhoef, Dahlström, & Freundt, 2014; Tang et 
al., 2014) and firm value (Leeflang et al., 2014). Extant literature 
suggests that UGC should be monitored in crises contingencies 
(Hsu & Lawrence, 2016; Sung & Hwang, 2014) because 
customers may erode a firm’s reputation when discussing 
critical events (Eckert, 2017; Gatzert, 2015; Leeflang et al., 
2014). 
 
3.2.4 Situational crisis communication theory 
 
Coombs’ (2007) SCCT states that a firm’s reputation is a valued 
asset that is threatened when stakeholders start to have negative 
perceptions of the firm’s actions (Coombs, 2007; Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002). SCCT links different crisis communication 
strategies to different types of crises, which are categorized as 
intentional and internal, intentional and external, unintentional 
and internal, and unintentional and external (Coombs & 
Holladay, 1996, 2001). 
The theory has been enriched through investigations into the 




2004) and the role of firms’ reputation in mitigating the current 
threat (Coombs & Holladay, 2006), as well as the effects of 
crisis communication on brand equity (Hegner, Beldad, & 
Kamphuis op Heghuis, 2014), people’s risk perceptions and 
perceived safety (Liu, Kim, & Pennington-Gray, 2015; Liu, 
Pennington-Gray, & Krieger, 2016). 
However, there has been little consideration of the role of 
different reputational dimensions in designing the appropriate 
crisis communication strategy. Thus, this study explores 
whether and how different dimensions of reputation change 




To analyse the relationship between data breaches and corporate 
reputation, firms in the sample had to meet the following criteria. 
First, firms had to suffer from a data breach in the previous three 
years, because the social media monitoring tool (SDL SM2) 
used for the subsequent extraction of the social media posting 
related to each firm did not allow data to be gathered beyond this 
period. To identify the firms, the study relied on Privacy
 Rights Clearinghouse 
(https://www.privacyrights.org), which is an open-source 
database that contains news on data breaches. The database only 




Three researchers independently integrated the list of firms with 
a manual search of data breach scandals that occurred worldwide 
in the previous three years. The unit of analysis was UGC related 
to firms that suffered from data breaches; thus, the sample was 
extracted by the social media monitoring tool SDL SM2. This 
enabled 250,000 postings about the same firm to be gathered for 
the period 2013–2016 from the following social media 
platforms: blogs, video microblogs (e.g., Twitter), social 
networks (e.g., Facebook), online message boards, wikis, photo 
sharing and classified/review sites. Next, the SDL SM2 search 
query was based on the firm name and refined by setting two 
parameters: English language and date range. For each 
company, social media data were collected considering the 15 
days before and after the data breach (as well as the date of the 
event publication) to capture the feelings stemming from the 
scandal. In this phase, no keywords (e.g., “data breaches”, 
“cyberattack”, “hacker”) were used to filter the search to avoid 
constraints in the overall picture regarding what users discussed 
soon after a scandal. 
The final sample was composed of 35 firms in nine industries 
(Appendix A) that had a data breach between 1 January 2013 
and 30 November 2016. To answer the first and second research 
questions, firms in the sample were grouped according to the 
type of data breach (Appendix A). 
Three researchers independently read news about data breaches 




the crises groups provided by the SCCT (Coombs & Holladay, 
1996, 2001) (Table 1). 
 





Unintentional and internal Intentional and external 
Insider: Someone with 
legitimate access 
intentionally breaches 
information  (e.g., 
employee, contractor or 
customer). 





memory stick, CDs, hard 
drive, data tape and 
stationary computers. 
Unintended  disclosure: 
Disclosure not involving 
hacking, intentional breach 
or physical loss  (e.g., 
sensitive information posted 
publicly, mishandled or sent 
to the wrong party via 
publishing online, sending 
in an email, sending in a 
mailing or sending via fax). 
Data and device losses: 
Includes paper documents 
(non-electronic),  laptop, 
PDA, smartphone, memory 
stick, CDs, hard drive and 
data tape. 
Payment card fraud: 
Fraud involving debit and 
credit cards that is not 
accomplished via hacking. 
Hacking or malware: 
Hacked by outside party or 
infected by malware. 
Data and device theft: 
Includes paper documents 
(non-electronic), laptop, 
PDA, smartphone, 
memory stick, CDs, hard 





The protagonists of the first and second categories of data breach 
were employees, who “accounted for 59% of security incidents 
in 2014, and in U.S. companies alone, the unauthorized use of 
computers by employees accounted for $40 billion in losses” 
(Manworren et al., 2016, p. 264). The study examined cases in 
which employees deliberately breached information, because 
white-collar crimes can be devastating for companies (Ferrell, 
2017; PwC, 2016). Further, cases in which employees 
unintentionally spread sensitive information in their activities of 




technologies and mobile devices, are particularly susceptible to 
cyberattacks (Manworren et al., 2016; PwC, 2016). The third 
category gathered data on intentional and external attacks 
(KPMG, 2016). 
 
To answer the first and third research questions, firms in the 
sample were classified according to their industry (Appendix A). 
 
3.3.2 Research design 
 
To answer the research questions, this study used the social 
media text-mining approach showed in Figure 1, based on recent 
applications in the information technology (IT) and marketing 
literature (Calheiros, Moro, & Rita, 2017; Moro, Cortez, & Rita, 
2015). Each phase of the analysis is described in depth in 
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. This section briefly illustrates the 
overall process, which consisted of two analyses. First, LDA 
analysis was conducted on the social media posts to extract the 
latent dimensions of the reputation. The process followed the 
steps illustrated by Tirunillai and Tellis (2014), so it began with 
pre-processing the textual information of the posts to transform 
an unstructured set of data into a structured list of words. The 
output is the corpus with all conjunctions and other basic and 
common terms removed that would not have provided any 
significant content to the study (e.g., “and”, “while”). Lastly, 
reputational dimensions were extracted from the corpus. Once 




second analysis, which conducted a detailed study of the content 
of the quotes representing the different dimensions and the 
valence characterizing each one. The qualitative data analysis 
software package NVivo 11 was used to conduct the analysis, 
categorize the quotes into the different dimensions extracted and 
value the related valence. 
 
3.3.3 Latent Dirichlet allocation 
 
This study extracted the reputational dimensions expressed in 
UGC using one of the base models in the family of “topic 
models” (Blei, 2012) represented by the LDA (Blei, Ng, & 
Jordan 2003), which can efficiently analyse big, sparse data 
(Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014). As highlighted by Tirunillai and 
Tellis (2014), text needs to be pre-processed to remove all words 
that do not provide meaningful content. This includes breaking 
text down into individual words (tokenizing) (Blei et al., 2002), 
removing non-word content (e.g., punctuations) and stopwords 
(e.g., pronouns), and reducing remaining words to the word they 
stemmed from (e.g., from “feelings” to “feel”) (Porter, 1980). 
After estimating the model and extracting the dimensions, it was 
important to give them appropriate labels by selecting top- 
ranked words for relative importance in the given dimension 
(Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014). The word(s) that had the highest 
relative importance in each dimension could provide labels for 




Labels were assigned considering the top five words for each 
topic (see Tables 3, 5 and 7 and Appendix B) and excluding 
words pertaining to industry-specific issues of the sample firms. 
These issues were too context specific and were not in line with 
the study’s goal of investigating corporate reputation 
dimensions (Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014). 
 




Figure 1. Proposed approach 
 
Given that the LDA model does not provide assumptions about 
the structure of the text (Tirunillai & Tellis, 2014), this study 
used text-mining analysis to gain a deeper understanding of the 
TYPE OF 
 
1° STEP: LDA 
ANALYSIS 





















content of the posts on social media and the valence associated 
with them. 
The analysis was conducted using NVivo 11, which is a 
qualitative data analysis software package that supports the 
identification, categorization and analysis of words and 
sentences forming the emerged dimensions (Bazeley & Jackson, 
2013). Recent studies in the management literature have used 
NVivo (Aitken & Paton, 2016; Hodges & Howieson, 2017; Taj, 
2016; Vernuccio & Ceccotti, 2015) because it provides rigour 
and traceability in unstructured qualitative data (Ananthram & 
Chan, 2013). In particular, this study implemented the latest 
version of the software (NVivo 11 Plus), which works 
efficiently with large amounts of data to provide insights into 
text content not only by theme (in this study, the corporate 
reputation dimensions), but also by sentiment (in this study, the 
valence characterizing a dimension). 
In relation to the content analysis, after the dimensions were 
established, a query search based on each one was performed. 
The analysis was conducted using two levels of specificity. In 
the first level, categorization was set to provide the exact 
dimensions identified by the LDA and supported by the 
literature—in particular, Walsh and Beatty’s (2007) customer- 
based reputation dimensions. In this case, the query search was 
set to find the dimensions’ exact match (e.g., search for 
“customer orientation”, find “customer orientation”). In the 




based corporate reputation factors were inserted into the query 
search (Table 2). 
Table 2. NVivo query search 




















Synonyms set in the 




























































Once NVivo 11 provided the different users’ quotes categorized 
by dimension, it was set to analyse the tone characterizing the 
posts in the categories using the command “identify sentiment 
per phrase”. NVivo 11 provided four types of sentiment: very 
negative, moderately negative, very positive and moderately 
positive. 
Given that the investigation was conducted in the 15 days after 
a scandal, there was a high chance that the “very positive” and 




“negative” or “neutral”. Thus, the three researchers 
independently coded the same users’ sentences and 
subsequently compared and discussed how they categorized the 
sentences to maximize reliability (Ananthram & Chan, 2013). 
 
3.4 Results 
This study used LDA analysis to extract and label the 
dimensions of reputation across all UGC for each of the 35 firms 
in the sample using the procedure suggested by Tirunillai and 
Tellis (2014). Moreover, LDA analysis was integrated with 
content and valence analysis to provide in-depth information 
regarding the dimensions that emerged. 
Tables 3, 5 and 7 provide snapshots of the top five words with 
the highest relative frequency relating to each dimension for the 
three types of data breach before and after the critical event. The 
labels were supported by the literature and assigned as follows. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the words “hire”, “skill”, 
“team”, “employee” and “work”, which can be referred to the 
employers of the firm, that can be labelled as “firm as 
employer”, consistently with the extant literature (Walker, 2010; 
Walsh & Beatty, 2007). Similarly, the second column 
characterizes firms’ corporate performance and the convenience 
of investing in them (“invest”, “financial”, “equity”, 
“investment”, “investors”). Thus, “corporate performance” is an 
appropriate label (Walker, 2010; Walsh & Beatty, 2007). 




customers’ needs (Patel, Manley, Hair, Ferrell, & Pieper, 2016; 
Walsh & Beatty, 2007). “Social responsibility” considers firms’ 
responsibility in relation to social issues (Patel et al., 2016; 
Walker, 2010; Walsh & Beatty, 2007), and “perceived quality” 
concerns customers’ perceptions of the quality of firms’ 
products and services (Walker, 2010; Walsh & Beatty, 2007). 
In addition, Tables 4, 6 and 8 outline the content and valence 
analysis implemented by NVivo 11. The LDA results of Tables 
4, 6 and 8 answer the first research question and show that UGC 
varied before and after a data breach occurred. In general, before 
a critical event, users discussed about one main topic: the 
perceived quality of a firm’s offer. Three additional dimensions 
then emerged—each characteristic of a specific type of data 
breach. Therefore, the second research question was addressed. 
 
3.4.1 Dimensions of reputation for intentional and internal data 
breaches 
 
Table 3 shows that when an intentional and internal data breach 
manifested, the “customer orientation” reputation dimension 
emerged through discussions about how much firms care about 
customers’ needs (“care”, “support”) and their ability to target 
(“custom”) assistance and provide it in a good way (“friendly”) 








Employer Corporate Perceived Customer Employer Corporate Perceived 
performance quality orientation performance quality 
 
 
Hire Invest Perform Care Employer Dividend Service 
Skill Financial Quality Support Employee Share Quality 
Team Equity Service Custom Compensation Equity Complaint 
Employee Investment Value Concern Training Investment Weakest 
Work Investor Product Friendly Responsible Investor Worry 
 
The second dimension that emerged (“employer”) relates to 
users’ interest in firms’ human resources management. From a 
comparison between the top five words before and after the data 
breach, the focus switched from general employees’ treatment 
(e.g., “hire”, “skill”) to specific aspects such as “compensation” 
and “training”. Further, the intentional nature of the scandal was 
reaffirmed (“responsible”). 
The third dimension discussed after an intentional and internal 
data breach was firms’ “corporate performance”, which appears 
to have been discussed even before the event. In both periods, 
users commented on firms’ financial decisions (“invest”, 
“investment”) and the subsequent results (“equity”, “dividend”, 
“share”). 
Finally, users discussed firms’ “perceived quality”, which was 
discussed before the critical event, but in different ways. In fact, 




to the performance (“perform”) and the value of the offer 
(“value”), while in the period after the event, the LDA analysis 
caught words related to users’ attitudes (“complaint”, “worry”) 
because of changes in the offer (“weakest”). 
Table 4 presents the results of the LDA analysis to provide a 
more in-depth answer to the second research question. First, 
users focused on firms’ customer service (“customer 
orientation”), “perceived quality” of firms’ products and 
services, and “corporate performance”. Valence is characterized 
by two extremes: if users perceived improvements in these 
dimensions, the tone was positive; otherwise, they valued firms’ 
efforts in a “negative” way. 
In “firm as employer” content analysis, “negative” tones were 
used to complain about the lack of training, with users 
hypothesizing the presence of resentful employees (an example 









@CapitalOneUK Found out that my 
CC is hacked! Capital One— 
excellent as always!! Helpful and 




AT&T Inc. God knows this is probably the worst 
example of customer service I have 
come across! 
Firm as employer AT&T Inc. I don’t have anything good to say 
about AT&T. They not only have 
very poor customer service, they 
have poor employee training and 















Sage Group PLC Sage says it doesn’t know how much 
data … Disgruntled ex-employee, 
maybe? 
AT&T Inc. Good job, I hope your shareholders 
are happy. 
Morgan Stanley  WOW! Time to divest yourself from 
Big Oil: Morgan Stanley's 











Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is 
going out to collect customer 
#feedback. 
AT&T Inc. Day 5 and counting, but my U-verse 
Internet service has STILL not been 
fixed by #AT&T. They are the worst 










3.4.2 Dimensions of reputation for unintentional and internal 
data breaches 
 
Table 5 presents the LDA results for unintentional and internal 
data breaches. The top five words for the dimension labelled 
“customer orientation” show that users showed “concern” and 
discussed whether firms are oriented towards customers’ needs 
(“care”, “support”), focusing on firms’ ability to be effective 
(“helpful”) while expecting regrets (“apologize”). The second 
dimension relates to the convenience of investing in firms 
suffering from a data breach (“stock”, “equity”). Moreover, 





Table 5. Dimensions of reputation for unintentional and internal data breaches 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 




Perceived quality Social 
responsibility 
  
Delivery Concern Finance Service Government 
Quality Helpful Governance Angry Social 
Product Support Stock Innovative Penalty 
Great Care Compliance Bad Occupational 
Service Apologize Equity Quality Educational 
 
Users also discussed the quality of firms’ products and services. 
This dimension was discussed before the critical event and, also 
in the case of unintentional and internal data breaches, the 
dynamics of the dimension show changes in users’ attitudes 
(“angry”) and in the quality of the offer (“bad”). Finally, users 
cared about the effect of unintentional and internal data breaches 
on society, discussing a “penalty”, the role of the “government”, 
and the “social”, “occupational” and “educational” aspects. 
Table 6 presents the content and valence analysis, which shows 
that the “customer orientation” dimension was characterized by 
a “negative” to “very negative” valence. The “corporate 
performance” dimension was characterized by genuine 
questions about firms’ ability to deal with cyber-related issues 
in the future and by ironic quotes that hide negative valence. 
Users negatively welcomed decreasing quality of firms’ 
products and services and focused on the ethical implications of 





Table 6. Content categorization and valence analysis for unintentional and 





Company Example Valence 
  
Customer orientation Aflac Inc. Why is this Aflac commercial so funny? Negative 
HSBC Holdings @HSBC_UAE_Help HSBC customer Very 
PLC service is an absolute disgrace! Rightly negative 
called   the   worst   bank   in   terms   of   the 
customer experience. #avoidHSBC. 
Corporate 
performance 






Perceived quality Toyota Motor 
Corp 
#HSBC Chairman getting very tired with a Negative 
shareholder listing all the bank’s failures. I 
can sympathise, it’s taking forever! 
Someone hacked my account “Toyota” and Negative 
stole my rsn. How do I recover it? 
Bank of America Bank of America: hard to believe account Very 
Corp security is your priority when you send a new negative 
card every 3 months because your database 
was compromised. 
Social responsibility Google Inc. Ethicists concerned after records show US 
government may wield troubling influence 




Finally closed my account with HSBC and 
switched to a more ethical bank :) it’s very 





3.4.3 Dimensions of reputation for intentional and external data 
breaches 
 
Table 7 shows that four dimensions emerged after an intentional 
and external data breach. The “customer orientation” 
reputational dimension focused on attributing responsibility 
(“blame”, “complain”) and how firms manage their responses 
(“communication”, “rude”, “customization”). The second 









Moreover, UGC presented arguments about firms’ management 
(“board”), financial results (“equity”, “bond”), and adherence to 
procedure and standards (“compliance”). 
Finally, users valued the efficiency and reliability of firms’ 
products and services (“speed”, “unsafe”, “weak”). Table 8 
shows that the general valence characterizing the emerged 
dimensions was “negative” or “very negative”. The tone was 
positive only when users perceived firms’ crisis management 
(an example of positive quote is the following one: “Tesco Bank 
have much better accounts than Barclays who also had a breach 
last year”) or initiatives (another example is “#Starbucks spends 
more on #employee #benefits each year than it does on #coffee. 
#interesting”) as effective. 
Table 7. Dimensions of reputation for intentional and external data breaches 
PRE-CRISIS   POST-CRISIS  
Corporate Perceived Customer Employer Corporate Perceived 
performance quality orientation performance quality 
Management Useful Rude Work Equity Product 
Finance Original Blame Resume Compliance Speed 
Acquisition Special Complain Train Board Unsafe 
Financial Quality Customization Internship Performance Weak 
















American express disappointed yo never 
responded back…so much for assistance! 
#Skype has been hacked. Check your 





Firm as theStarbucks #Starbucks spends more on #employee Positive 
employer Corp #benefits each year than it does on #coffee. 
#interesting. 




bank details. TalkTalk senior management 
should hire someone who understands 
security. 




by 11%. Another example of the cost of 
poor reputation management. 
Yahoo STILL says a LOT about Yahoo’s security 
practices. EVEN after the breach, why 








Tesco Bank have much better accounts 
than Barclays who also had a breach last 
year. 
Positive 
LinkedIn I might be more worried about the Negative 
Corp LinkedIn data breach if there was actually 
any value contained in my account. 
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The third research question of this study aimed to understand 
how UGC changes in relation to different industries. The study 
provides the top five words (Appendix B) and the dynamics of 
dimensions per industry (Appendix C). Overall, there is no a 
clear distinction among industries. However, users seem to 
discuss one main topic around companies of all the industries 
involved: “perceived quality”. Instead, after a data breach, users 
discussed firms’ corporate performance in most of the industries 
of the sample—particularly for “information technology”, 
“manufacturing”, “software & services” and “finance and 
insurance”. Owing to space limitations, Table 9 provides the 
best representative quote per industry to highlight the main 
valence of the quotes. 
 
Table 9. Content and valence analysis per industry 
 
Industry Company    Quote examples Valence 
  
Accommodation Starbucks Waking up to $400 fraudulent charges to Negative 




Starbucks on my credit card. 
Disney      I would try to  watch old Disney movies  on 
my phone and it get hacked and my phone 
not work right. 
 
Negative 




and warehousing Airlines 
weekend. If you’ve used it, change your 
passwords :( #annoying. 
United Airlines is annoying 😐. They 
don’t do nothing on time. I sprinted over 










Time to sack Chief Executive (Baroness) 
Dido (Diana) Harding for incompetence. 
lack of company knowledge and poor 





HIS ACCOUNT GOT HACKED. 















Apparel. They do so much good work. 
Let’s be patient while they deal with this. 
Just laugh at how silly/ridiculous the 
comics and hacker are, and not take it so 
seriously :). 
Cisco Thanks Cisco: I am now infinitely more 
alert and alarmed about shadowy hackers 
than I was 30. We have a new hero against 







Software & Dropbox How  can  I  be  sure  that  my  Dropbox Very 
services 
 
Finance and HSBC 
account will not be compromised in the 
future? I’ve lost total confidence. 









refund the money fraudulently taken from 
my bank account through HSBC’s poor 
security? 
Tesco bank account breaches— 











A threat for a growing number of firms in various industries is 
the occurrence of different breaches of sensitive corporate data. 
These critical events represent vulnerability for firms’ corporate 
reputation, whose multiple dimensions are affected by 
customers’ negative perceptions in various ways. Some 
dimensions (e.g., “perceived quality”, “customer orientation”, 
“corporate performance”) are important across different types of 
data breach and across industries, whereas other dimensions 
(e.g., “employer”, “social responsibility”) are important only for 
certain events and industries. Capturing such information and 
details represent a challenge for companies and represent a key 
finding of the present study. The following sections provide 
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insightful details related to when and how different corporate 
reputation vulnerabilities stem from different data breaches. 
 
3.5.1 When and how customers react to data breaches? 
 
Figure 2 highlights that when a breach of sensitive data has been 
committed for malicious purposes (with a high level of 
intentionality), it leads to two negative reputational drawbacks. 
First, customers believe that firms are unable to train employees 
to prevent external hacks or to recognize/denounce colleagues 
who commit a cybercrime. Second, the lack of timely and 
meaningful information by customer service exacerbate 
customers’ negative perceptions of customer orientation-related 
training. These negative drawbacks may be because of training 
programs that teach standardized customer care techniques, 
which may not fit with the extraordinary nature of data breaches. 
The result is that the “employer” corporate reputation dimension 
is negatively affected, and firms gain a reputation for lacking 
effective and systematic human resources management. This 
finding confirms studies in the relationship marketing literature 
that have found that timely and relevant communication forms 
positive perceptions in the consumer–brand relationship if it is 
“timely, meaningful, accurate, adequate, complete and credible” 
(Graca, Barry, & Doney, 2015, p. 807), and empathetic 
(Sarmento, Simões, & Farhangmehr, 2015), especially in social 
media environments (Gensler, Völckner, Liu-Thompkins, & 
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Wiertz, 2013; Labrecque, vor dem Esche, Mathwick, Novak, & 
Hofacker, 2013). 
Further, this study integrates the notion that, in times of crises, 
employees show more commitment in delivering appropriate 
information to external stakeholders (van der Vegt, Essens, 
Wahlström, & George, 2015; Zhang & Venkatesh, 2013). In 
fact, their interest in performing well may be hindered by a lack 
of key information provided in a timely fashion, so they are 
unable to accomplish their assignments related to customer care. 
Thus, firms should prioritize timely access to salient information 
about the ongoing crisis because this plays a critical role in 


































3.5.2 When and how customers pay attention to firms’ ability to 
protect their privacy 
 
When a data breach stems from an unintentional error caused by 
a firm’s internal employee, customers examine firms’ 
cybersecurity measures and show concern about possible 
identity theft and online fraud. Further, they feel disappointed 
about how their personal information has been managed. This 
finding recalls the social contract theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1994; Ferrell, 2017), which notes that a moral contract drives 
INTENTIONAL 
DATA BREACHES KEY ROLE OF EMPLOYER 
AS CORPORATE 
REPUTATION DIMENSION 
KEY ROLE OF EMPLOYER 
AS CORPORATE 
REPUTATION DIMENSION 


































basic relationships between society and an individual. In a 
business context, this means that customers expect ethical and 
legal penalties for firms that have not protected their privacy 
rights within a society. Thus, an unintentional data breach sheds 
light on the “social responsibility” dimension of corporate 
dimension (Figure 2), and customers perceive that they are 
victims of an unfair error that could have been avoided with the 
implementation of systematic data privacy risk management. 
This finding contrasts with prior literature, which has found that 
unintentional breaches should be perceived as minor 
transgressions when related to privacy concerns and ethical 
responsibilities in sharing sensitive information (Stewart, 2017). 
Conversely, this result confirms recent studies that have 
underlined the relevance of inserting firms’ use of consumer 
data into a larger societal picture (Ferrell, 2017; Martin & 
Murphy, 2017; Stewart, 2017). 
 
3.5.3 Customers’ perceptions and valence across industries 
 
Contrary to previous studies on the effect of data breach 
announcements (Martin et al., 2017; Rosati et al., 2017), not all 
industries suffered from reputational drawbacks after a data 
breach. The discriminant lies in the role of sensitive data in each 
industry. If they are not the core business of the firms (e.g., 
manufacturing), corporate reputation is less vulnerable than in 
firms where consumers’ data are particularly sensitive (e.g., 
finance and insurance). In the latter, the results suggest that an 
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effective corporate communication strategy for external 
stakeholders should protect the “corporate performance” 
reputational dimension, which was negatively affected by data 




This study makes several academic and practical contributions 
to the literature. In relation to theoretical contributions, it 
complements crisis communication research by categorizing, in 
a different data breach context, stakeholders’ perceptions of 
firms’ ability to control the crisis, as well as the level of 
responsibility that stakeholders attribute to firms—the so-called 
“responsibility reputation” (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). 
 
In addition, the research is informative for risk management 
literature (Gatzert, 2015) and reputation research (Walsh & 
Beatty, 2007; Walsh et al., 2009; Wepener & Boshoff, 2015) 
because it is one of the first studies to test corporate reputation 
dimensions in a data breach crisis setting (Martin & Murphy, 
2017; Martin et al., 2017). 
The managerial implications of this study are twofold. First, the 
investigation in nine industries enables some generalizations to 
be made about the main reputational drivers that managers 
should consider when designing a communication recovery 
response. Boosting a consumer-centric communication plan 
may be helpful to avoid damage to firms’ reputation. Thus, for 
instance, if the data breach stems from an unintentional error, 
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managers should explicitly share their efforts to improve 
voluntary security breach initiatives and their strict compliance 
with government guidelines. If, instead, the data breach is 
intentional, managers should encourage top–down 
communication to foster customer service employees’ 
awareness about the ongoing crisis. In fact, an informed 
employee is more likely to provide effective and empathetic 
customer support. 
Second, this study provides managers with a methodology— 
LDA analysis triangulated with a content and valence 
investigation—that comprises useful steps to unveil the 
corporate reputation dimensions that emerge in rich user- 
generated data after a data breach. This method also has scope 




This paper investigated the effect of data breaches on corporate 
reputation. Prior research has indicated that these new and 
unpredictable threats may have significant drawbacks for vital 
corporate dimensions. Further, in the Industry 4.0 era, 
conversations about these scandals on social media can 
exacerbate the negative effects. In this context, this study 
conducted LDA analysis on social media UGC for a sample of 
35 firms in nine industries that suffered from a data breach 
incident in the period 2013–2016 to discover how reputational 
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dimensions change before and after these critical events, as well 
as the differences among the types of data breach and industries. 
Future research should better focus on the main differences 
among industries to understand the impact of data breaches on 
reputation dimensions. 
Furthermore, this investigation considered what happens to 
customers’ perceptions within a short period surrounding a data 
security event. Future research could complement this study by 
investigating how firms restore their reputation after these 
negative events, as well as which approach enables better 
recovery across industries and within a longer-term framework. 
Further, the study considered only one data breach event per 
firm, although some firms experienced the same type of breach 
multiple times. Future research could determine whether the 
presence of past crises plays a role in the formation of 
customers’ perceptions and valence. 
To conclude, this paper suggests that the analysis of a 
multidimensional construct such as reputation within a critical 
event is complex because it is influenced by several factors 
simultaneously. The holistic discussion provided by this 
research about the varying dynamics in different types of crisis 
and industry will help managers and researchers to better 
understand the common paths across firms and the distinctive 
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Appendix A. Sample demographic and organizational characteristics 
 
Type of dataCompany Date made Industry 
breach public 
  
Intentional and Hilton Hotels 25/09/2015 Accommodation and Food 
internal Services 
Morgan Stanley  05/01/2015 Finance and Insurance 
Federal Deposit24/10/2015 Finance and Insurance 
Insurance Corporation 
Capital One Financial04/03/2014 Finance and Insurance 
Corp 
AT&T Inc. 08/04/2015 Information Technology 
Sage Group PLC 11/08/2016 Software & Services 
Unintentional and Bank of America Corp  17/07/2014 Finance and Insurance 
internal Goldman  Sachs  Group02/07/2014 Finance and Insurance 
Inc. 
Highmark Inc. 05/06/2014 Finance and Insurance 
HSBC Holdings PLC 13/01/2016  Finance and Insurance Aflac 
Inc. 20/05/2016 Finance and Insurance 
Humana Inc. 09/10/2015 Finance and Insurance 
Google Inc. 06/05/2016 Software & Services 
Toyota Motor Corp 26/08/2016 Manufacturing 
Cisco Systems Inc. 25/10/2016 Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
Intentional and Starbucks Corp 12/05/2015 Accommodation and Food 
external Services 
Walt Disney Co 30/07//2016 Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 
American Express Co 07/04/2014 Finance and Insurance Tesco 
Personal Finance06/11/2016 Finance and Insurance PLC 
Skype Inc. 01/01/2014 Software & Services 
Yahoo  22/09/2016 Software & Services 
LinkedIn Corp  17/05/2016 Software & Services 
eBay Inc.  21/05/2014 Software & Services 
TalkTalk Telecom24/10/2015 Information Technology 
Group PLC 
Dropbox  27/08/2016 Software & Services 
American Apparel20/02/2015 Manufacturing 
(USA) LLC 





Kickstarter PBC 15/02/2014 Public-benefit 
Corporation 
 
Myspace Inc. 31/05/2016 Software & Services  
Snap Inc. 04/03/2016 Software & Services  
Ashley Madison 19/07/2015 Software & Services  
Foursquare Labs Inc. 21/10/2016 Software & Services  
Adult FriendFinder 22/05/2015 Software & Services  
United Airlines, Inc. 01/01/2015 Transportation 
Warehousing 
and 
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Appendix C. Dynamics of the dimensions of reputation before and after a data 
breach in different industries 
 








Industry PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST 




        














        
Information technology ✓ ✓    ✓  ✓   
Manufacturing ✓ ✓      ✓   




        
Software & services ✓ ✓      ✓   




Modern firms are characterised by an intensive use of IT. The 
literature has extensively explored the advantages of such a 
technological progress, but research on its possible drawbacks 
appears scant. An emergent threat firms must face is cyber risks, 
whose occurrences have led to significant breaches involving 
entire supply chains. In 2013, Target experienced a significant 
breach involving the theft of roughly 70 million customers’ data 
and at least 40 million payment cards (Manworren et al., 2016; 
Shackleford, 2015; Shackelford, 2012). The first victim of the 
cyber attack was a link in Target’s company chain, the HVAC 
vendor Fazio Mechanical Services. The attackers stole network 
credentials from Fazio and used them to enter the Target 
network and eventually steal massive amounts of data over 
several months. 
Home Depot, another large retailer, experienced a credit card 
breach in 2014. The company declared it was not a breach in the 
first place and that the breach stemmed from a third-party vendor 
(Shackleford, 2015). 
In 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
revealed a massive breach of 22 million records, including 
sensitive data tied to numerous federal employees, contractors 
and military personnel (Shackleford, 2015). 
The consequences of these emergent risks seem dramatic, and 
the risk management domain and the SC literature have 
reckoned that cyber risks may cause business disruptions and 
damages to tangible and intangible corporate assets and have 
provided studies about how an effective cyber risk management 
process should be planned to prevent and manage these cyber 
risks. 
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However, the aforementioned studies are mainly theoretical and 
there is still a significant lack of empirical studies in the 
management literature measuring the potential effects of cyber 
threats within single companies and along networks of 
relationships in a wider SC perspective. 
The present thesis aims to fill some of these gaps in three 
empirical essays. 
Through the lens of the dynamic capabilities theory, the first 
studies the risk management practices of 15 European firms 
through the fsQCA method, which allows the researchers to 
ascertain how managers perceive cyber risks. The study 
confirms the IT literature with regard to requiring technical 
solutions but suggests they be integrated with relational and 
firmal capabilities, in line with the dynamic capability literature. 
Dynamic capabilities theory can help managers shape the firm 
of SC relationships in order to invest in shared resources, aligned 
decision-making, common objectives and the transversal 
adoption of risk management procedures, which might also 
include insurance, hedging and buffer inventories. Moreover, a 
managerial framework is built that suggests implementing both 
technical (e.g. software, insurance and investments in IT assets) 
and firmal (e.g. team work, human IT resources) capabilities to 
protect the company’s ability to create value. 
The second essay extends the investigation of the drawbacks of 
cyber risks to SCs. An empirical investigation of several 
European firms is performed, providing evidence that 
investments in SC mitigation strategies are scant and that firms 
comprising SCs behave as if they have a high risk appetite, 
whereas managers declare they have a low risk-taking approach. 
Moreover, a general lack of awareness emerges regarding the 
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effects that IT and cyber risks may have on supply operations 
and relationships. 
Thus, a framework drawing upon SC risk management is 
proposed, offering a holistic risk management process in which 
strategies, processes, technologies and human resources are 
aligned and cohere with the governance of each firm and of the 
SC as a whole. 
The third essay draws on the situational crisis communication 
theory (SCCT) to ascertain whether and how different types of 
cyber breaches differently affect corporate reputation, defined as 
a multidimensional construct in which the perceptions of 
customers, suppliers, (potential) employees, investors and local 
communities converge. This is among the first studies to analyse 
the different reputational drawbacks these types of risk may 
cause. 
The literature categorises breaches into three groups: intentional 
and internal to the firm (e.g. malicious employees stealing 
customers’ data); unintentional and internal to the firm (e.g. 
incorrect security settings that expose private information); and 
intentional and external to the firm (e.g. ransomware infecting 
companies’ software). 
Moreover, the study considers that, in the industry 4.0 era, social 
media analysis may be of paramount importance for firms to 
understand the market. 
In fact, UGC might help in understanding which dimensions of 
the corporation have been more attacked after a data breach. In 
this context, the study implements the LDA automated method, 
a base model in the family of ‘topic models’, to extract the 
reputational dimensions expressed in UGC from a sample of 35 
firms in nine industries that had data breach incidents between 
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2013 and 2016. The results reveal that, in general, after a data 
breach three dimensions – perceived quality, customer 
orientation and corporate performance – are subject to debate for 
users. However, if the data breach was intentional and malicious, 
users focus more on the role of firms’ human resource 
management, whereas if users do not identify the company as 
responsible, they focus more on privacy drawbacks. 
The study complements crisis communication research by 
categorizing stakeholders’ perceptions of a crisis in a data 
breach context. In addition, the research is informative for risk 
management literature and reputation research by analysing 
corporate reputation dimensions in a data breach crisis setting. 
Further research should analyse the connections between how 
firms have to manage the SC and big data such as UGC in a 
cyber risk framework. The academic research should provide 
methods and guidelines on how to triangulate market data, sales, 
social media, demographic and direct data inputs to predict the 
occurrence of a cyber threat. Studies might also focus on the 
roles the Internet of Things (IoT) and machine learning might 
have in providing real-time data to predict unplanned 
downtimes. 
Moreover, the study of big data such as UGC throughout the SC 
might help prevent or manage reputation drawbacks. In this 
context, further investigation should shed light on whether 
companies should rely on external insurance companies to 
manage breaches in corporate reputation or whether companies 
should manage drawbacks in their image due to cyber risks 
through a reputation framework. 
The aforementioned insights provide a glimpse into the 
numerous gaps in the academic literature. The analysis of big 
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data sources throughout the SC might be a key tool to run at the 
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